



P.L.O., WHERE TO ?

FIGHTING AUTHORITY: YES, DEVIATIONIST STATE: NO

After five postponements, the Palestine National Council held its 12th session at the headquarters of the Arab League in Cairo, June 1-9, 1974, and not at a Palestinian refugee camp.

The series of postponements which began in mid-January 1974 were not accidental. It was directly related to the political context that prevailed since the cease-fire of October 22, 1973, between Egypt and Syria on the one hand and Israel on the other. The leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which regards Palestine as the focal-point of the Arab-Zionist conflict, refused to take any decisions concerning such important issues as the disengagement of Arab forces, the attempted Americanization of the Arab world or the Geneva Peace Conference, its sponsors, and its attendants. Instead, the PLO adopted a wait-and-see attitude until the champions settled the central issues among themselves and set in motion a settlement scenario that was intended to secure the safety, prosperity and recognition of Israel via Cairo and Riyadh by courtesy of Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon. Only at this juncture did the PLO leadership see fit to call the council into session and called for the adoption of a phased program that presupposed co-ordinated policies on the part of Syria, Egypt and the PLO regarding a peace settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

As the PLO stood watching and its diplomatists travelled from one capital to another, basking in the sun of mythical statehood, it occupied its followers with symposia, forums, debates and endless discussions and justified the long interregnum on the grounds of providing the cadres and fighters with an opportunity to engage in «democratic dialogue» with a view to producing the 'Palestinian decision' for the immediate stage and thereby strengthening the long-term strategic program of the revolution. Meanwhile the peace locomotive which was launched with the commencement of the cease-fire between the Arab states and Israel (October 22, 1973), traversed a long distance since, and passed through the curves of the political landscape unhampered by visible and unforeseen obstacles

and it is still travelling at a high velocity without a recognizable prospect of derailment as perceived by Sadat and Co.; a perception that overlooks the revolution and its ability to reverse the whole capitulationist process. Finally, when it appeared that decision-making could no longer be deferred, the PLO leadership formed a seven-man committee (May 8-19) consisting of the commando movement leaders, and came out with a «working paper» as a foundation stone for the new policy that was to be adopted by the Palestine National Council.

Prior to its approval by the PNC, the PLO leadership attempted to convert the «working paper» into a policy statement before the Council met (May 20), but failed because the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) pinpointed the nature of the paper and insisted that there was no unanimity of opinion on all points in it.

In fact, the PFLP asserted that the «working paper» could not be considered more than a framework for discussion, which had to be enriched, elaborated upon and finally legislated into a publicly declared policy by the Council through the Executive Committee.

However, this standpoint did not seem to satisfy the «consensus» makers who set out to argue clandestinely that the 10-points were not only agreed upon by all concerned but were in fact authored and signed by Dr. Habash of the PFLP. Unhappily, such falsehood deceived a few members of the resistance and a representative of the Front had to stand up in the Council and expose the lie and challenge its promoters to produce the so-called «document» that was allegedly signed and sealed by Dr. Habash. Only by such an attack were the capitulationists wholly unmasked and their rumor-mongering stamped out.

This PLO attempt to bulldoze the Council into agreeing with its position was a plan designed by the capitulationists to push through an ineffective program without accountability and without providing the Council members with an opportunity to express their views and offer amendments to the proposed 10-point

program. This strategy on the part of the leadership was revealed the moment the session opened. Khaled Fahoum, Chairman of the PLO National Council, read numerous messages from Palestinians from inside and outside occupied Palestine, but he concentrated on messages that appealed to the Council to enact the 10-point program and cited a long message, allegedly written by the martyrs of the Maalot operation (May 15) which was obviously written by none other than Nayef Hawatmeh of the PFLP, calling for the establishment of a «national authority on any territory wrested from the Zionist enemy». To show his partiality, Mr. Fahoum, on instructions of Abu Ammar, refused to read a memorandum sent to the Council by

Mr. Yahya Hamouda, the former chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, and Bahjat Abu Gharbya, also a former member of the Executive. Fahoum also tried unsuccessfully to bypass messages and memoranda submitted by professional organizations such as lawyers and engineers and mass organizations such as Women, Trade Unions and Student Federations. But the representatives of these movements showed their temper during the discussions and made life uncomfortable for the Geneva champions by dissecting the latter's arguments and refuting them one by one in a most merciless and methodical manner. The General Union of Palestine Students (GUPS) was particularly active at the Council's meetings and contested the right of Arabi Awad to speak on behalf of the National Front in the occupied territory. Indeed, the students duelled with AbuAmmar and wondered aloud whether he was leading the revolution into a blind ally. And the women's small delegation of four sought greater representation for their lady comrades and decidedly failed to strike a responsive cord in a leadership that excluded women and male observers after issuing special passes to them. Finally, some women forced their way back into the Council under the energetic leadership of Fatma, an observer from Iraq, who terrorized AbuAmmar and dismissed him as a «showman».

Furthermore, it is essential to stress Fahoum's position which reflected that of AbuAmmar's, who had met with Sadat in Alexandria on May 31, 1974, when the latter who had planned to address the Council in person, decided not to do so and sent a message instead. Here are the essential parts that relate to Sadat's own policy, how he envisages his relations with the PLO, the Arab states, and implicitly, the enemy, and how he understands Palestinian rights:

«The disengagement on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts is not the end; it is only the beginning. It is a purely military step coming as it is in the wake of winning an important round. We are going ahead with the process of consolidating our military capacity in order to be able to face all possibilities.





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«The most important thing which will naturally come to the fore is how to deal with the essence of the Palestinian problem which, for so long, has been overshadowed by many other events.

«This new situation confronts your conference with a historic responsibility which I know very well is not only heavy but also decisive. But I am confident that you will shoulder it no less courageously than you have done in the hours of fighting and sacrifice.

«Here I would like to stress some concepts which from our own view point are fixed principles from which there is no deviation:

«Egypt fully respects your freedom to adopt whatever resolutions you wish to adopt and believes that the resolutions should be purely Palestinian. While it is the duty of an Arab party to offer any view to you, it is not the right of any Arab party to exercise any pressure on you.

«Together with our Arab brothers who attended the Algiers Summit Conference in November 1973, we agreed that the PLO is the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and we still stick to this commitment.

«We have repeatedly declared that you are the sole holders of the right to speak in the name of Palestinians and we still adhere to this commitment. We have always affirmed that there will be no relinquishing of the legal rights of the Palestinian people as set by their own representatives and we still adhere to this commitment.

«Experience has shown that Arab solidarity was one of the most effective weapons of victory and strength which enabled us to face the whole world from a position of a new strength.

«Hence our continued efforts to maintain this solidarity and to exert every possible effort so that our ranks may not be broken again whatever the circumstances, particularly since the stage we are approaching is not less dangerous than that what we have passed.

«Arab solidarity could become more effective and stronger than what we have already achieved.

«We expect that your decisions will assert that the unity of Palestinian ranks will, no doubt, be one of your most effective weapons and that you take your decisions while you struggle for them.

«In conclusion, I have no doubt that the whole Arab nation shares my view when I say that the rights of the Palestinian people are a trust and that Palestinians on the western bank (of River Jordan), in Gaza, in Israeli prisons and in camps are part of us.

«This commitment to the Palestinian people in neither transitory nor

dependent on their gaining their legitimate rights.

«It is a continuous commitment which unites us, and our common heritage with its branches extending far into the future.»

Sadat's secret manipulation of the Council was illustrated not only by his absence — he apparently feared a demonstration against his position in the Council — and the private meetings he held with PLO leaders, but by calls for «realism» transmitted by his newly acquired editor Tsar of Al-Ahram, Ahmed BahaEddin and by the Rose El Yusif magazine which published a lengthy article advocating recognition of Israel while the Council was in session, and as if daily urgings, pleadings and insinuations in the press, and instructions by emissaries were not enough, the Egyptian Gazette took it upon itself to attack the PFLP for its alleged lack of flexibility (June 9) and contended that «Surely it would have been better to go to Geneva, even uninvited, to push the Palestine case with utmost vigour, than to adopt a non-constructive attitude based partly on violence of the wrong type. What the Palestinian representatives should do is to contribute a worthwhile constructive element with every opportunity that offers itself.»

Furthermore, the Gazette offered advice for free and wrapped it with this insult, provincial observation:

«The attitude now adopted is strange considering that the Palestinians are the principal party concerned. The fact that Israel occupied territory of Egypt and Syria as well as the West Bank of the Jordan in June, 1967, does not mean that the Palestinians' rights as the first injured party in the Middle East are any the less. Egypt and Syria have been fighting for the Palestinians just as much as they have been fighting to recover their own territory. Had it not been for the Palestinian cause neither Egypt, Syria nor any other Arab country would have been involved in the Middle East conflict. It was because Israel violated the rights of the Palestinians that the Arabs found themselves at war with Israel in the first place. The situation culminated in the total occupation of Palestine when the West Bank including the Gaza Strip came under the Israeli heel in 1967. It was not until the October War that Israel suffered a reverse but it was such a reverse that it has changed the entire situation and the way is now open for a settlement in accordance with UN resolutions which can only be implemented when Israel withdraws from occupied Arab territory and gives the Palestinians their rights.»


In its final evaluative editorial of the Council's decisions, the Gazette affirmed:

«The Palestinians should certainly

realise that the Geneva talks are vital to their future. If they are fighters, as they claim they are, they should use any forum to fight for their cause. If the talks fail, the Palestinians will have lost nothing as the fight will still go on. But it would be foolish to lose an opportunity of stating their case before a world forum at a conference which is specifically called to give the Arabs, above all the Palestinians, their rights.»

The extent of Egyptian influence was further disclosed when AbuAmmar launched a massive counter-attack against the «Rejection Front» (June 5) which was on the verge of snowballing the defeatists. He stated that he didn't look upon the «Nationalist October War» as an observer but as a participant «whose revolution contributed 25-27 platoons to the war effort» and shared in its decision-making. He also advocated co-ordination with Egypt and Syria and declared his intention to become a «peace martyr without martyring the revolution» and stressed that «we must interact with the positives of the October War in the same manner we reacted to the negatives of 1967». AbuAmmar's participant role and his intimate relations with the Egyptian leadership were confirmed when the newly-elected Executive Committee met with President Sadat on June 11. «I would like you to know», Sadat proudly proclaimed to the PLO Executive, «that the decision to cross the Canal and wage overall confrontation was only known to four persons: I, brother President Hafiz Al-Assad, Field Marshal Ahmed Ismail, but the fourth person was my brother Yasser Arafat». And looking at Abu Ammar he added, «there is nothing more indicative of my confidence in you. You are our partners, you have kept the secret of battle, and you were loyal to the covenant of friendship».

As to the suppression of the Hamouda — AbuGharbya memorandum, it must be pointed out that it annoyed the Geneva-bound diplomats because the leadership had foreknowledge of its content since it was published by the Kuwaiti newspaper, Al-Siasa on May 28-29, and its logic and arguments were devastating. In their 14 points, the authors underlined the simple fact that the resistance was facing the issue of its continued existence or extinction in view of impending settlement attempts. They contended that no settlement can be carried out unless the resistance is wiped out, Israeli aggression is sanctified and Israel is recognized and legitimized as a Middle Eastern state. And they declared that the call for a «counterfeit Palestinian entity» is no more than a means of deflecting the Palestinians from the revolutionary path and creating artificial distinctions between them such as «refugees, residents and emigrants» in a



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state that will not be permitted to be used as a base for liberation but as a base for the elimination of the Palestine National Movement. Since the October War proved the ability of the Arab soldier to fight and defeat the «invincible Israelis» and since the resistance has mounted successful operations in the heart of the 1948 territory and spread havoc in the entire homeland, it follows that what is required is the escalation of people's war and the pursuit of the enemy until victory is achieved. Instead of intensifying such a strategy, the «tired revolutionaries» hitched themselves to Sadat's bandwagon and resolved to work under U.S. auspices to obtain a «sentinel state» at any price and set out to create the appropriate atmosphere by carrying out guerilla operations that signified «bridge-crossing» for the Palestinians of an authentic revolutionary state. The authors describe the developing Palestinian trends thus:

«Those who are desperately planning to go to Geneva regard those who demand liberation as negativists. Voices are loudly raised calling for phased objectives, phased goals, minimum and maximum goals. All those slogans are used as justifications. For instance, the partition of Palestine which was rejected by the Palestinians in 1947, has become a phased objective and the creation of a national authority on any territory from which the enemy withdraws is entitled a short-lived objective. Until recently the mere discussion of such matters was considered treason and their discussants were accused of squandering national rights, but today the capitulationists proudly consider treason, planning and programming and they know that such slogans are both deceptive and wrong, yet they sugarcoat them in order to pave the road of capitulation and final liquidation of the resistance on the way to Geneva and the eternal embrace of Zionism, Imperialism and Arab reaction».

That AbuAmmar did not permit the circulation of the memorandum



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was not the only misdeed he committed on the first day of the Council session. He committed an act that predicted ill for the Conference and the fate of the Palestinian resistance. AbuAmmar moved a motion that co-opted the eight «deported» West Bankers to council membership in violation of established procedure, which stipulates that only the Executive or the Preparatory Committee have the power to make N.P.C. nominations. At any rate, opponents of the motion pointed out that some of the nominees did not subscribe to the Charter of the PLO and its political program which was approved by the 11th session (Jan. 6-12, 1973). Indeed, a member stressed the fact that the eight were «delegated» not «deported» and they're out to propagate a Palestinian statelet that recognized Israel and advocated going to Geneva within the frame-work of the resolution 242 openly. Unfortunately, arguments were to no avail and AbuAmmar insisted on calling for the vote. But each nominee was voted upon separately: Walid Kamhawi 102, Arabi Awad 90, Abd Al-Jawad Saleh 99, Jiryas Kawass 76, Abd Al-Mohsen Abu Meizar 102, Hussein Oudeh 90, Shaker AbuHajala 90, Hussein Kanoub 84. Of a potential vote of 179 only 130 were present and voting and of those voting only Abu Ammar fans were enthusiastic. Abu Ammar's «victory», however, shocked him and revealed the strength of the opposition to his schemes. Consequently, he marshalled his forces quickly and voted down a motion put by Bahjat Abu Gharbya which would have co-opted Dr. Samir Ghousheh of the Popular Struggle Front to the Council, had it passed.

Although the voting pattern had a sobering effect on AbuAmmar, it outraged the professorial talkers of the PDF who dubbed it as the revenge of «buried chauvinist positions on the part of the extreme left» and their mouthpiece Al-Hourriya, the group's organ, denounced it as «the manoeuver of divisive elements»

whose Rejection Front would be «steamrolled into sputtering inactivity by the end of the Conference». And the same editors trotted out their worn-out cliches: «the PFLP is a nihilist, verbal, reactionary force; it is a capitulationist, bankrupt minority living on illusions and juggleries». And Al-Hourriya added further: «We espouse the revolutionary, nationalist position, whereas the Rejection Front, a conflicting admixture of marginal groups, is not a Front that advocates the rejection of a settlement but the rejection and hindrance of every Palestine or Arab nationalist struggle whose objective is the frustration of American imposed settlement conditions and the wresting of concrete, national gains for the Palestinian people.»

The PDF, AbuAmmar's Trojan horse, had little or no impact on the Conference. Its *Philosopher Kings* were ignored and its heroes were no more than background figures passing periodically on a Shakespearian stage as the «greats» struggled for power and visibility. Hence, for the first five days of the 12th session, the Rejection Front was gathering momentum, building alliances with independents

and second and third cadets Fatehites and presenting itself as the true revolutionary alternative to capitulation. The Rejection Front was spearheaded by the PFLP which was armed with a well-prepared position that had been outlined by Dr. Habash, its Secretary General, on December 17, 1973. Here is Dr. Habash's position as reported in a suppressed issue of Palestine, the Revolution, which was the organ of the PLO Unified Information Committee: that is no longer unified under the separatist, factionalist and right-wing leadership of Majid AbuSharar, Abu Ammar's appointed Messiah to the news media the world over.

«Dr. Habash contended that American imperialism is the principal enemy of the Arab people and that it has to be extirpated if the counter-revolutionary tide were to be stemmed in the Mideast region.

He insisted that Zionism and Israel are no more than tails of the imperialist serpent and dealing with them as if they were the principal enemy was an attempt to sidetrack the major issue. The U.S., he asserted cannot be permitted to arbitrate between Arab and Jew when it is a partisan and a

protector of Zionism that aims at the destruction of the Arab revolution.

In defining America as the principal enemy, Dr. Habash pointed out that the principle of self-sufficiency must be the governor of the Palestine Arab revolution and declared that the Palestine revolution must rely on the unity of its own masses of workers and peasants and camp dwellers and on the Arab progressive and nationalist forces. He had no doubts that the Soviet Union, the socialist camp and the people's Republic of China would come to the Arab's aid «when we set out to liberate the homeland and expel American imperialism and its agents from Arab territory».

Dr. Habash stressed the national as opposed to the regional character of the revolution and quoted president Boumediene to the effect, «the closer the Zionists get to the gates of Damascus and Cairo the closer is the day of Arab national liberation and the transformation of Arab society».

Dr. Habash commended the PLO's historic decision which rejected the Security Council resolution (242), as far back as the autumn of 1967 and urged the PLO leadership to reaffirm that standpoint and to refuse to go to the so-called Geneva conference, which postulates 242 as its modus operandi. He reiterated the PFLP's refusal to compromise on the historic rights of Palestinians, and called on the PLO to continue its objective of national liberation and to repudiate «deviationist measures» that forfeit Palestinian rights.»

In view of the PFLP's faultless logic and the authenticity of voices speaking for the revolution, those vacillating between Geneva and revolution gradually but swiftly moved to the circle of rejecting the proposed 10-point program and set out to persuade the proponents of the so-called «national authority» to abstain from their standpoint and follow the revolution's line. The latter started to moderate their position and argued that there was no ready-made imperialist-Zionist liquidationist settlement but there were attempts afoot to reach a settlement in the Mideast. They said that the struggle was raging between two sides: Arab and Soviet versus the US and Israel. And if the Palestinians would like to have a settlement favourable to their interests, they must become an essential part of the struggle and exert all the influence they could in order to achieve a fighting national authority».

In this calm environment of interaction, «democratic dialogue» had its effects. It became possible to put both new proposals before the Political Committee, and amendments as well. Unhappily for the Imperialist press and its imitators, however, it only got wind of a part of the Conference and





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immediately put on its wires dispatches that portrayed the Conference as split and foretold of the imminent division of the PLO and the walking out of the PFLP, the Arab Liberation Front, the PFLP — General Command and some prominent independents. Not knowing that the PFLP is highly committed to national unity, the enemies of the revolution rejoiced momentarily but they were stunned when they learned that an agreement had been reached on June 8 and was made public on June 9. The agreement stipulated that the Council be called into an immediate session whenever a «destinational question» arose for the Palestine revolution and made it abundantly clear that the PLO will under no circumstances subscribe to 242 or abide by its conditions.

The 10-point program was adopted by the Council with only four voting against it. **(For PLO Provisional Program, refer to document)**

Since the PFLP was principally concerned with the continuity of the revolution rather than ingratiating itself with US imperialism, it placed before the Council its own interpretation of the 10-point program. It said that «we understand that 242 is decisively rejected, that the refusal to participate in the Geneva Conference is a clear matter to which we cling strongly; that the revolution cannot be a party to a negotiated settlement with the enemy; that the national authority has to be truly national and cannot be accepted if it were produced by arrangements other than those of armed struggle and people's war; and finally, that Jordan is part of the imperialist conspiracy and its «United Kingdom» plan must be rejected and every form of co-ordination with Hussein must be refused. The PFLP's understanding concluded that Hussein must be overthrown and replaced by a «Jordanian-Palestinian united front.»

Moreover, the PFLP organ, Al-Hadaf, had underscored the fact that the Arab states «bartered Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory for the occupation of the entire Arab world by Imperialism and Zionism (June, 1, 1974); and published a note (June 15) stating that should the revolution deviate from its declared objectives «there will be no rescue from retribution for the manipulators of the Arabi Awad's variety of false parliamentarism». And Al-Hadaf added: «the objective is clear. Israel is not alone and the road to Zionist settlements on the Golan Heights must pass through Damascus on the banks of the Barada river. And our road to the West Bank cannot but pass on the royal bridges on the East Bank. And to Galilee our road passes through struggles waged at Ghandour factory in Beirut and through the Lebanese masses. As to the area west of Palestine where Si-

nai lies and Gaza lives, the other Farouq started building a peace fence for Israel. In order to smash that obstacle, we, and the workers of Hilwan and the students of Ein Shams and Alexandria universities and «Bahiya» and Sheikh Imam of the film «Sparrow» and all the advocates of revolution are one united voice screaming onward with the Arab revolution!».

Meanwhile, the Geneva comedians are trying to justify their ambiguous mandate by pointing out that if UN resolution 242 is replaced by another «international framework» they would be prepared to go to Geneva and wrench their beloved «national au-

war of annihilation against the Palestinians dissent is likely to multiply in Fateh's circles and assume unforeseen proportions for AbuAmmar. This trend manifested itself at the Council meetings when AbuIyad and Sami Attari, the two second men in command of Fateh and Saiqa respectively, challenged their leaders openly. Both AbuAmmar (Fateh's leader and chairman of the PLO) and Zuhair Mohsen (Saiqa's leader and head of the military department of the PLO) strongly favored a blanket endorsement of the 10-point program without «a comma change» as Abu Ammar declared. They seemed to be much more interested in the formal as

and the intensification of armed struggle. Consequently, this prominent and powerful wing in both Fateh and Saiqa are most definitely on the offensive as Geneva fades, the Arab states falter and Israel goes more lunatic as a result of incessant commando strikes inside the occupied territories. In sum, Israel might turn out to be the best peace wrecker Kissinger ever conceived of negotiating with and force upon a reluctant Sadat a fifth Arab-Israeli round in order to revenge its wounded self and give out to its stained image as the Sparta of East. Under these circumstances, AbuAmmar will have indeed become a «peace martyr» whose memory would be immortalized by Sadat scribes and celebrated by Beirut editorialists for his statesmanship and revolutionary strength.

Now that the first «provisional program» in the history of the Arab revolution has been adopted, it remains to be seen whether the revolution's logic or the logic of statism shall prevail. But we are certain of one thing: the revolution is irreversible and its triumph is inevitable.

Meanwhile, it is believed that the program and the national unity it embodies will have a unifying effect inside and outside occupied territory and that the Arab states could no longer dissociate themselves from supporting Palestinian rights on the pretext that the resistance is divided and doesn't know what it wants.

Indeed, the Arab states can no longer deny their commitment to the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people which they enunciated at the Algiers summit conference, November 27-29, 1973 and by implication disclaimed the Hashemite monarchy as the legitimate claimant of the West Bank.

Finally, the composition of the Executive Committee which consists of seven independents, six Commando representatives and AbuAmmar as chairman and «representative of the Palestinian masses», does not predict well for the revolution. But as the PFLP — General Command declared in its welcoming Shamir operation (June 13) for Mr. Nixon's «pacific» invasion of the Middle East (June 12-18): «He who can get to the heart of the homeland can reach all traitors, deviationists and agents».

Lastly, we are of the opinion that should the PLO Executive Committee betray its trust and forsake us for a Kingdom of servitude, it will be among those consigned to the dustbin of history and its members placed in the palace of treachery and the revolution will go on and build the republic of freedom in Palestine on the ashes of Imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction.



thority» from the clutches of Hussein and Israel, a move which they are parading around as a Palestinian cure-all that will mark the beginning of the «secular democratic state» from the Mediterranean Sea to the River Jordan. But unfortunately for those rising political black magicians, fissures appeared in their ranks during the Conference and are likely to grow in the months ahead as the dream of statehood recedes in the corridors of the palace of nations where procrastination and postponements are the order of the day.

Moreover, as Israel accelerates its

opposed to the substantive contents of 10-points, whereas Attari adopted the Rejection Front's position, emphasizing the Baath party's ideological commitment to pan-Arabism and revolution and AbuIyad cast serious doubt about the prospects of Geneva. Indeed, he said, Geneva was not within reach and if it were so, it is not likely to be held in the near future. Besides, he pointed out, Israel is intent on liquidating the resistance and will insist on deferring Geneva until it achieved its aims. Therefore, what the resistance should be concerned about is not Geneva but its survival



P.L.O PROVISIONAL PROGRAM THE 12th NATIONAL COUNCIL JUNE 1-9-1974

Based on the Palestine Liberation Organization National Charter and its Political Program adopted in its eleventh session (Cairo, December 6-12, 1972), and its belief that a just and permanent peace in the region is impossible unless the Palestinian people regain their full national rights, particularly their right to return and determine their destiny on all their national soil; and in the light of the new political conditions which have risen since the last session, the Palestine National Council decides the following:

1. Re-affirming the previous stand taken by the Palestine Liberation Organization that resolution 242, which suppresses the national rights of our people, deals with the cause of our people as a problem of refugees.

Therefore, the Organization refuses to deal with this resolution on this basis at any level, whether Arab or international, and including the Geneva Conference.

2. The P.L.O., struggles by all methods, foremost of which is the method of armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian lands and establish the fighting, independent national authority of the people on any part of Palestinian soil that is liberated. This will be realized by introducing more changes to the balance of power, in the interest of our people and their struggle.

3. The P.L.O. struggles against any plan for a Palestinian entity whose price is recognition (of Israel), peace and secure borders, the renunciation of the historical right (to the whole of Palestine), and the deprivation of our people of their right to return and their right to self-determination on their national soil.

4. Any step of liberation that is taken is a link in the chain of seek-

ing to realize the strategy of the P.L.O., which is to establish the Palestinian democratic state as specified in the resolutions of the past National Councils.

5. The P.L.O. struggles with the Jordanian national forces to establish a Jordanian-Palestinian national front, whose objective is to establish a democratic national regime in Jordan which would merge with the Palestinian entity that will be established as a result of the struggle.

6. The P.L.O. struggles to establish a unity of struggle between the Palestinian and Arab people, and between all forces of Arab liberation that agree to this program.

7. In the light of this program, the Liberation Organization struggles to strengthen and promote national unity to a level which would enable it to undertake its national and Arab duties and tasks.

8. The Palestine national authority, after its establishment, will struggle to urge the confrontation states to complete the full liberation of the Palestinian soil as a step toward pan-Arab unity.

9. The P.L.O. struggles to consolidate its solidarity with the socialist states and the international forces of liberation and progress for the sake of defeating all Zionist-reactionary-imperialist conspiracies.

10. In the light of this program, the leadership of the revolution lays down the tactics that will serve and secure the realization of these objectives.

The executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation will put this program to work, and if a fateful situation that has to do with the future of the Palestinian people arises, the National Council will be called for an extraordinary session which is to take a decision regarding this situation.



P. F. L. P. ALTERNATIVE PROGRAM

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine presented the following ten points program to the Twelfth Palestinian National Council meeting in Cairo, which took place June 1st to 9th, 1974.

1. To work for the solidification of the Palestinian national unity among all the organizations of the Palestinian Resistance Movement, as well as between it and the masses in order to confront the conspiracies that aim at dividing the Palestinian national movement.

2. To protect the achievements realized by the Palestinian people through their years of struggle, the most prominent of which is their right to carry arms to maintain the struggle until total liberation of the Palestinian national soil.

3. To mobilize and organize the Palestinian and Arab masses and to strengthen the links of national unity and struggle between our masses both inside and outside the occupied territories. To build the united national Palestinian front on the basis of the Palestine National Charter and the Political Program of the P.L.O. To fight against any sectarian call in the ranks of our people.

4. To encircle and combat all reactionary and hireling calls for returning (the West Bank) to the Jordanian regime. To fight any settlement that may be attempted by the reactionary regime, in particular the United Arab Kingdom plan: at the expense of the rights of our people. To reject any cooperation with the regime.

5. To start working seriously and on a scientific basis to establish the Jordanian Palestinian national front, and continue the struggle against the puppet Jordanian regime to bring it down and establish the democratic national regime which will facilitate continuous struggle for the liberation of Palestine.

6. To struggle seriously to abort the Geneva Conference which is based on resolution 242, or any other conference convened on the basis of this resolution. To defeat all capitulationist settlements which aim at our people's cause and distort it in so called «authorities» or «Palestinian state» on part of Palestine. To con-

front such proposals with the armed struggle and the related political struggle of the masses.

7. To determine that the P.L.O., the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, will be kept outside the framework of any settlement that entails negotiations with the Zionist enemy or his recognition (of Israel). To struggle against any Palestinian part which goes to Geneva or elsewhere to participate in negotiations.

8. To impose the sovereignty of the Arab Palestinian people on any Palestinian land that is liberated, so that our people, through it, will continue their fight and armed struggle and the political struggle linked with it to liberate the other parts.

To emphasize that any Palestinian authority established on any Palestinian land as a result of a political settlement based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, cannot but be a reactionary authority or a capitulating one. The P.L.O. should not recognize it as representative of Palestinian national struggle.

9. To consider the Arab Front for Participation (with the Palestinian Revolution) a struggle tool that will mobilize the masses to oppose the imperialist conspiracies that aim at liquidating the Palestinian cause. To urge that it carries an effective role in order to abort conspiracies; to maintain the solidarity and cooperation with the Arab national liberation movements. To cooperate in the political, military, cultural and institutional fields in order to fight against the reactionary forces.

10. To emphasize that the Palestinian and Arab struggle is firmly and decisively on the side of the forces of the world revolution. The contribution of the Arab struggle to resolve any differences in the world revolutionary movement should be primarily made through dealing with its own problems and challenges that face it. To strengthen the alliances with the national liberation movements and the democratic forces in the capitalist countries and all the socialist countries, and to work in order to gain their support.



FEISAL



SAUD

SAUDI ARABIA: THE SUPER PENINSULAR POWER

The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a name that came into being on September 23, 1932. It was given by Ibn Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, the founder of the state, to the territories of the Najd, Asir, Shammar, and Hijaz at the suggestion of his friend and great admirer, Harry St. John Philby, the British agent - emissary to the House of Saud. Abdul Aziz had the distinctive humility of being the second man in recorded history - the first was Uthman, who generously bestowed his name on the Ottoman empire - for having conferred on his conquered subjects his namesake. As a Wahabi, he forged an army of religious zealots who sought to purify Islam of accumulated superstition and deviationist practices. The Ikhwan, brothers, who formed the back-bone of Saud's army were a strict fundamentalist sect that was inspired by Abdul Wahab, a religious reformer of the 18th century, who allied himself with the Saudi dynasty in order to realize his objectives. Abdul Aziz, though pious and devout, nevertheless was a state builder who wielded the power of scimitar and lance not only for the purpose of spreading Islam, but also for the political aggrandizement of the House of Saud and its British allies, whose annual subsidy of £60,000 during the First World War and the supply of military hardware enabled him not only to survive adversity and tribalism in the desert, but also to subdue his rivals, the Ibn Rashid dynasty in Shammar, and Hussain, the Hashemite King of Hijaz. Why did the British shift their support from Hussain, their own manufactured King of Hijaz, and self-proclaimed caliph (after the Turks had abolished the caliphate in 1924) and King of the Arabs, to Ibn Saud remains historically ambiguous, though it is often attributed to a division of labour and competition between the India Office and the Cairo Arab Bureau; to the intractability and megalomania of Hussain and malleability of Ibn Saud; and, finally, to Hussain's refusal then belated acceptance of the British scheme for the establishment of a «Jewish homeland» in Palestine. Whatever the reasons for Ibn Saud's

«election» over his rivals by the British, it is worth noting that the «honeymoon» did not outlast the expulsion of Sherif Hussain of Mecca (1926) and the signing of the Jeddah Treaty (May 20, 1927) by which the British recognized Abdul Aziz's autonomy and abrogated the Katif Treaty (December 26, 1915) which had conferred on him a protectorate status. For insufficiently explained reasons, such as the world's 1929 depression, the British abandoned Abdul Aziz to the Americans who purchased him for the grand Manhattan-size prize of £5,000 sterling (five thousand) in gold and a loan of £30,000 sterling (thirty thousand) tendered by the Standard Oil Co. of California (Socal) whose wily agents were none other than the famous Mr. St. John Philby and Ameen Rihani, the Lebanese-American and so-called Arab nationalist writer. The Rockefellers must have been truly delighted for obtaining such an oil concession (May 29, 1933) for the above exorbitant free enterprising competitive price in a free market economy.

From 1933 until his death on November 9, 1953, Abdul Aziz remained firmly embedded in the virginal innocence of U.S. oil, (in 1932, Abdul Aziz boasted in front of his friend Philby that until then he had only conquered 135 virgins and over 100 others); the «liberating» philanthropy of selfless Americans (Charles Crane was supposed to have provided the King with a free geologist, Mr. Karl Twitchell of Socal in 1929); and the stunning generosity and defense of the U.S. government, the «arsenal of democracy». It appears to the casual observer as if Abdul Aziz founded a state on a combination of religion and oil to the glory of Islam, the growth of Saudi civilization and the expansion of the American empire. But in fact, as an oriental despot, Abdul Aziz did not preoccupy himself with the well-being of his subjects, but the elimination of his opponents and the marriage of their wives and daughters. Before and after the unification of the country, he had hoped to pursue the Hashemites to Jordan and Iraq, but the British did not want him to do so. He

thereupon launched an attack against the Yemen (1934) and succeeded in placing the Hamid El-Din dynasty within his orbit and made certain that all his surrounding neighbors deferred to him with a little help from the British — from Kuwait to the Trucial States to Oman on the Arab Gulf to the Yemen and the Aden Protectorates and their numerous sultans in the south, to Jordan, Syria and Iraq in the north.

To counter-balance Hashemite power, Abdul Aziz befriended the then nationalist movement in Syria and the Albanian monarchy of Egypt. This ostensibly pro-Arab policy was the cornerstone of his Arab strategy and that of his successor until revolutionary ideas and nationalist regimes made their appearance in the Arab East and West. Though he tried to become caliph and called a Moslem Congress to acclaim him (in 1928) «Prince of Faithfuls», he failed to mount a Moslem crusade in his behalf or use Islam as an effective instrument of Saudi foreign policy. But it was a potent domestic weapon whose export was confined to the Arabian peninsula. Therefore, Abdul Aziz had no where to go but to the cradle of protestant christianity, the house of the Rockefellers and the Chase Manhattan Bank, the country of Roosevelt, Truman and their successors, who for a drop of oil and a Jewish vote in New York would be prepared to bring untold misery and havoc on an unsuspecting humanity.

It was thus ordained on February 18, 1943:

«My Dear Mr. Settinius:

For purposes of implementing the authority conferred upon you as Lease-Land Administrator by Executive Order No. 8926, dated October 28, 1941, and in order to enable you to arrange lend-lease aid to the Government of Saudi Arabia, I hereby find that the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States.

Sincerely Yours,
Franklin D. Roosevelt

(Leonard Mosley, *Power Play*, p. 116)
Under Lend-Lease, U.S. munifi-

cence to Abdul Aziz amounted to \$99 million. The aid was channeled through the British because some of the radical «new dealers» in Congress didn't think that Saudi Arabia was a great democracy. The British gladly obliged and tried to make comeback to Saudi Arabia, however they were rudely nudged out by the newly formed international oil cartels. Aramco (January 31, 1944) whose forerunner, Socal, had arranged for the Lend-Lease aid, an undertaking that according to Richard O'Connor's *Oil Barons* (p. 340) that «we believed them (the oil company) of the burden of financing the king; it enhanced the American company's prestige and importance; it committed the United States to the protection of the American concession in Saudi Arabia and removed the possibility of British penetration.

Put more bluntly, the U.S. Treaties were placed at the service of an Arab despot, with bills being paid by the American taxpayer. And the self-righteous Yankee author adds: «King Ibn Saud, a reactionary of the most ferocious type, was made the pet of the Roosevelt administration though some of its more doctrinaire liberals had to bite the bullet in going along with that program.» (p. 341).

Roosevelt's «pet», King Abdul Aziz, and his great benefactor met aboard the USS Quincy on February 8, 1945 in the Great Bitter Lake, on the Gulf of Suez. Roosevelt promised him two things: «he, as President would never do anything hostile to the Arabs and the US Government would make no basic change in its Palestine policy without consulting both Arabs and Jews beforehand. Happily for Roosevelt, he was dead within two months «and within a year his successor, President Truman summoned unhappy American ambassadors in the Arab world and annulled both promises with the words: «I am sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands of people who are anxious for the success of Zionism, I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arab among my constituents.» (cited in the *British Guardian*, November 1, 1973).

In 1950, with the advent of the Korean war, the consolidation of the Chinese revolution, and America's entanglement in people's counter-insurgency in the Far East and South East Asia, America's business, which is Aramco's business, also became Saudi's business and ever since Saudi Arabia became the center of gravity for U.S. oilmen, political entrepreneurs and soldiers, Saudi destiny became manifest and the trinity that vultured its oil — the U.S. government, Aramco, the House of Saud — was to sustain itself as one and indivisible until it is torn asunder by the ring of the oppressed.

Ibn Saud, son of Abdul Aziz, replaced his father in November 9, 1953. His brother Feisal, who had been his father's foreign minister since 1919 — he was then 14 years old — was made viceroy. Ibn Saud followed in the footsteps of his father, but because of changing times, what had been invisible in yester year had to become visible and transparent to the naked eye in the mid-1950's. The whole period of Ibn Saud's paramountcy (November 9, 1953 to November 2, 1964) and the preordained

role he had to play can be summed up by a visit he made to his «friend», president Eisenhower of the United States on January 30, 1957. In those days the ill-conceived Eisenhower doctrine was being propounded and Ibn Saud conceived of himself as the counterpose to, Nasserism. Here is how Feisal's official biographer, Gerald De Gaury, explains the encounter between the «beloved» Ike and «the gigantic Saud», who in his Arab dress seemed «destined to play the part assigned to him by Eisenhower, of the greatest leader in the Middle East». And De Gaury continues:

«When the president began his formal talks with him, explaining the Eisenhower doctrine, Saud pointed that to make it acceptable it must appear to the Arabs equally paying to them, if not more so, than Nasser's policy. Nasser had nationalized the canal and acquired all its immense revenues. The doctrine should be at least as attractive as was positive neutralism and financially more advantageous. A promise of protection against communism alone was not enough to sway the people. After six

days of talk it was agreed the Saudis would be furnished with a generous quantity of air, ground and naval equipment, opportunities for training of fighter pilots, for buying naval vessels, be given tanks, artillery, arms and ammunition, fighter aircraft, the service of technicians and a loan of 250 million dollars.

In return, Saud promised to give a five year renewal of the use of Dhahran, in eastern Saudi Arabia, by United States aircraft and to explain the Eisenhower doctrine to the Arab States. The President was delighted. His personal aircraft took Saud and his suite back to Europe and the Arab World.»

(Feisal, King of Saudi Arabia, p. 83).

King-Saud took himself quite seriously in his U.S.-allocated task. He therefore, set out not to outbid Nasser as the champion of Arab nationalism and eclipse him, but to topple him without troubling himself with such things as radicalism, conservative realism or reformism. He plotted to have Nasser assassinated by his own security chief, Mr. Serraj and failed. Then in cooperation with Hussein, whom he had maintained in power in the spring of 1957, by despatching contingents of Beduin troops to shore him up against a nationalist officer's revolt, Saud formed a «syndicate of Kings» which engineered a coup d'etat that separated Syria from the UAR (September 28, 1961) and put Nasser on the defensive. Saud was the paymaster of the plot and seemed contrite when he was confronted with the story after his deposition. Regarding the matter, Mohamed Heikal reports the following in *Nasser, the Cairo Documents* (p. 182): «At that time it was said that Saud financed the coup d'etat with £7,000,000 sterling. But that was not quite true. When he came to Egypt as a political refugee after his brother Feisal had forced him to abdicate, Nasser taxed him with this, saying: 'How could you pay seven million pounds to those people?' And Saud said, 'I'm ashamed to tell you. It wasn't seven, it was twelve million.'»


Saud retained his power until the autumn of 1964. His regime had been periodically criticized by U.S. oilmen and their journalistic propagandists for being too strict and conservative at home — which is to say, the Americans were not permitted to turn Saudi Arabia into another brothel on the Gulf; for being anti-semitic, that is, failing to make Riyadh another New York for Jewish capitalists; and, finally Saud's usefulness was put in question because he was heedless of the environment surrounding him. In other words, Saud was condemned and deposed for his inability to prosecute successfully a war of counter-insurgency against the newly established Yemen republic (September 26,

1962) which had supplanted the medieval Imamate of the Hamid El-Din dynasty. Then Feisal stepped into the picture with gusto and a new era of U.S.-Saudi collaboration was inaugurated.

To establish his credibility vis-à-vis American, Moslem and Arab, Feisal started his regal career by embarking on a policy that viewed Islam as its ideology, the Koran as its constitution, and the oil as its inheritance. That is, «Saudi Arabia sees itself as the source of Arabism and the heartland of Islam, with the sovereign as custodian of the Holy Places. It feels that the Muslim world is looking to it for an example» (*The Times of London, January 28, 1974.*) The *Times'* writer is in error with reference to the ranking of Arabism and Islam. Islam, in Feisal's view precedes Arabism, not vice versa.

Thus Feisal's self-perceptions were articulated in three officially-sponsored books in Arabic: 1) *The Saudi Arabian Kingdom and Its Economic Evolution* by Feisal Abdul-Rahman El-Sadiri (1967); 2) *The Saudi Arabian Kingdom At the Crossroads*, by Fahd Khaled El-Sadiri (1970); and, 3) *Miracle In the Desert* by Ahmad Asa (1972). Each of these books outlines the same thesis. The only difference between each of them is the degree of sophistication on the part of the author and the date of its publication which takes into account the latest available material. The first El-Sadiri states that Saudi Arabia is «the first homeland of Islam and the Arabs.» It is a place where «security, freedom and progress» prosper. There is «a government», El-Sadiri contends «which is based on Islam, right, justice freedoms». Feisal's government is said to practice «responsible Arab politics, faithfulness to Islam and loyalty to Palestine, friendship to all». He points out that the bug bear of Saudi politics is the twin danger of Zionism and communism which «threatens christianity and Islam». El-Sadiri alleges that «Zionism invented communism in order to combat faith, destroy nations and religions and remain by itself the sole undisputed force» in world affairs. Since Saudi Arabia is the historic heart of Islam and Arabism, because it was the first modern manifestation of Arab unity; it follows that «Islam must be revised the world over and its teachings spread to rid the Moslems of superstition and backwardness», and constitute itself as a countervailing force to Zionism and communism.

Fahd El-Sadiri is a little more explicit than his namesake. He asserts that Saudi Arabia's foreign policy is based on the following principles: Saudi national interest, non-alignment and non-expansionism, opposition to interference in peninsular affairs and cooperation with the oil producing



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states. In El-Sadiri's view, Saudi's «Arab policy» was most aptly concretized in Feisal's «national commitment» to the Arab cause at the Fourth Arab Summit Conference at Kartoum (August 29-September 2, 1967) where Feisal resolved the Yemen dispute with President Nasser and decided to grant Egypt \$200 million per annum until the «traces of the June 5, 1967 aggression are removed». El-Sadiri also insists that Fateh - the only Palestine guerrilla organization which Saudi Arabia recognizes - must operate within «Arab strategy» while maintaining its independence. As to international politics, the bogey is the same for El-Sadiri: it is Zionism and communism «whose East European communist experts in the Arab states leaked out information to the Israelis which enabled them to carry out the June aggression». He states that Jews are very influential in all Communist parties and, in some instances, constitute more than 10% of the membership in central committees. Moreover, Arab and Soviet objectives conflict and the Soviet Union wants a state of no peace, no war in order to expand in the Arab world and avoid collusion with the U.S.

Ahmad Assa reiterates the same points and applies them globally: Islam has transcended tribe and nation and solved human problems whereas neither socialism nor capitalism has. He posits Islam as the genuine alternative to all isms and concentrates his efforts at overcoming the «revolutionary climate». He says the proponents of revolution have explained the loss of Palestine in terms of backwardness and held that its abolition is a necessary means to liberation, an approach which paved the way to military coups and consequently, opened the door to marxism, an ideology that Zionism had imported to the Arab world and incubated in Arab Jewish circles until Arab Apostles were trained and started to disseminate communism and adopted Palestine as a marxist symbol. Assa elaborates further: Zionism which created Israel

in cooperation with the Marxist and the imperialist West, put before its very eyes the conquest of the largest possible area of Arab land which is also Islamic land. Marxism is the offspring of Zionism and it is used to wage class war, to deflect man from the true path of liberation and to infiltrate Asia and Africa and dominate them for the purpose of marketing goods, plundering resources and subjecting people to Zionist influence.

This conspiracy theory of history which finds a Zionist-communist under every bed, except that of Feisal's, abhorrently divided the world into Zionists and non-Zionists and conceives of Islam as the single road of righteousness. But somehow, it seems totally incapable of making single allusion to U.S. imperialism and its robbery of the Arab world in general and Saudi Arabia in particular. Most lately, the views of Feisal's «authors» were most succinctly put by him (An Nahar April 2, 1974) to a visiting Lebanese delegation, headed by Pierre Gemayel, the leader of the prototype fascist phalangist party of Lebanon, Feisal said, according to An-Nahar, that «Zionism created communism in order to dominate the world. Unfortunately, there are some Arab brethren who have embraced communism and repudiated God». And he added further: «There are communists among the Palestinians who are carrying out Zionist schemes but there can be no believing Arab who can allow Zionism to govern his country». And Feisal went on: Friedmann issued a book in which he said that the origin of the Jews is mogul. They were christians and Moslems. There were many conflicts between the two sects until an accord was reached by which they adopted Judaism and put an end to their conflicts. Zionism exploits everything. The third protocol of the protocol of the Wisemen of Zion includes the exploitation of Communism and Masonism for the Zionist interests». Feisal is not merely an upholder of the conspiracy theory but also a racist of the most abo-

minable kind! That's America's top man in the Arab world and America is hoping to make him an Arab king, and a Moslem caliph, in addition to being a super peninsular power.

The Saudi opposition to Feisal, which is growing rapidly, has published irrefutable exposes (five issues between March 1973 and April 1974 of Saout Altaliah, Voice of the Vanguard, and six issues of El-Jazirah El-Jadiddah, the New Island) that bare the sham religiosity of Feisal, the treasonous character of his regime, the tyrannic and autocratic aspects of his rulership and the traitorous mentality of his entire entourage and the history of his dynasty. Altaliah declares that Feisal uses Islam as a shield in his struggle against the will of the Arab nation, that his leadership is promotive of co-existence among reactionaries, that his policies are designed to serve imperialism behind a religious curtain, that he has become America's substitute to the Baghdad Pact and its spearhead in the Arab Gulf and its environs.

A cursory look at the 10 year history of Feisal's Saudi Arabia easily corroborates Altaliah's allegations. But a quotation from one of Feisal's apologists will suffice. The latter Assa justifies Saudi intervention in the Yemen where «communism» was broken on the rocky mountains and in the deep valleys of Yemen:

«The Yemen rebellion was planned and prepared outside Yemen and without mass support. Its objective was to make Yemen the foothold and fulcrum point of the Marxist tide in order to extend to the entire Arab peninsula and take over the Islamic Holy Places and exploit them with a view to blackmailing the Muslim world. The aim of the rebellion was not only to plunder the oil and mineral wealth of Saudi Arabia, but also the whole Gulf and to deprive the people of their own resources. It was intended as a means of conquering the Arab East under the banner of scientific socialism, which was raised by certain re-

volutionary states, and deluded the people into believing that it is the successful prescription that would wipe out Israel and liberate usurped Palestine». No Freudian psychoanalyst is required to disentangle and expose Assa's projectionism! Furthermore, Feisal's «Islamic policy» was embodied in stances held and propounded at seven Arab summits (convened between January 13, 1964 and November 27, 1973) and two Islamic Summits: Rabat, September 22, 1969, Lahore February 22-24, 1974. At these international forums, Saudi Arabia waged America's wars by proxy. Feisal operated in accordance with pre-arranged plans and manipulated, threatened and cajoled in the great style of his allies. He spoke little, but his voice was widely heard and listened to. He was able to divert the Arab summits from engaging in war preparations against Zionism and imperialism by mobilizing all and sundry to argue that the Arabs were incapable of defeating the enemy and that they should wait indefinitely until the U.S. changed its policy. Meanwhile, to hasten U.S. policy changes, the Arabs should adopt a policy that neutralizes the U.S. vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict, that solidifies the Arab front by abandoning «socialist measures» and fighting atheism and communism, and that implements a truce on Arab disputes and freezes potential differences among Arabs. At Moslem summits, Feisal made religion the *raison d'être* of existence, Jerusalem the heavenly abode of Islam, Palestine the land of return and promise to the Palestinians; yet in both instances, he expended a pittance for the cause and his admirers rode roughshod over others who had the temerity to present other ideas, such as asking the Moslem states, especially Iran, to sever its relations with Israel, or propose an Islamic boycott of Israel and its sponsors. At any rate, Feisal did not only arrogate the right to himself to decide what is best for the Arabs over the years but has asserted his inherent right to interfere in the af-

fairs of South Yemen (in September of 1972) and to send 15,000 to 20,000 troops to Kuwait in its dispute with Iraq in March of 1973. As regards the October war of 1973, and Feisal's use of the so-called oil weapon, his stands are condemned by his own words and retreats on the three fundamental issues which he outlined, in an interview he gave to *Al-Gomhouria*, the Egyptian newspaper, on November 22, 1973.

He said : Saudi Arabia would continue to use the oil weapon in the Arab struggle until three objectives had been gained. «**These were : complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, granting of the right of self-determination to the Palestinian people, and affirmation of the Arabism of Jerusalem. In clearer and more decisive words, Saudi Arabia will not change its attitude of suspending oil exports to some countries and cutting back quantities to other countries except after the fulfilment of these points collectively and in a manner acceptable to all Arabs - no matter how long it takes.**»

Mr. Mahmoud Reda, managing

oil embargo. And Jerusalem remained in Israeli hands, the Palestinians without rights and the Arab territories occupied. And Feisal, the devout, ascetic, Moslem ruler, remained faithful not to Islam and Arabism but to the mighty dollar, to the U.S. and to Aramco's oilmen !

Since we harbor no illusions regarding Feisal's moral and religious rectitude, we can without compunction paraphrase and reproduce recently disclosed and authenticated secret documents that appeared in the Lebanese weekly, *Ad-Dastour* (No. 183, April 15-21, 1974, p. 15-19), and implicated Feisal in a gigantic conspiracy «against» the Arab nation and Yemen unity.

The Saudi documents (all in Arabic) consist of a plan King Feisal proposed to president Lyndon Baines Johnson of the United States (dated December 27, 1966) ; a document (dated December 16, 1966) prepared by the Special Cabinet Committee in collaboration with the CIA agent Kim Roosevelt, and his cohorts, on which Feisal's proposals are based ;

The crucial aspect of the Feisal

proposal relates to the « dangerous role » Egypt was playing in Yemen and Nasser's alleged failure to abide by the **Jedda agreement** (August 24 1965), which he signed with Feisal. The agreement stipulated Egyptian withdrawal from the Yemen and the establishment of a council of national reconciliation with a view to restoring peace and order in the Yemen. Moreover, because of Feisal's fear of the spread of the revolutionary contagion, he had to remind the U.S., the British and his fellow Sheikhs and Sultans of the **communist menace** » that was knocking on their gates. He therefore, pointed out to Johnson that «**the destiny which binds the Saudi family to America derives its strength from the same objectives that bind America to our family.**» «**Working together in the two worlds of Arabism and Islam,**» Feisal declares, «**we can constitute a vast force to protect our mutual interests, and combat communism and its destructive principles, irrespective of the names it assumes such as revolutionism, republicanism, anti-imperialism, Arab nationalism, freedom, so-**

cialism and unity or unity, freedom and socialism.» Moreover, the Saudi family challenges all these principles and their likes because these are no more than slogans of the inveterate enemy, communism, which aims at gobbling up the joint interests that bind us together.

With such preamble, Feisal plunges directly into his invidious proposals : 1) that the U.S. supports Israel to carry out a lightning attack against Egypt and takeover vital areas in Egypt and in order to force her to withdraw from the Yemen and to preoccupy her with Israel for a protracted period of time. By such action, no Egyptian can raise his head beyond the canal or aspire again to restore Mohammed Ali's or Nasser's ambition of Arab unity. Furthermore, we shall have ample opportunity to liquidate the destructive principles of communism not only in our kingdom but the Arab states as well. Finally, taking into account the maxim «**pity a humiliated people**» there is no objection to the grant of a subsidy to Egypt and her likes ; 2) Syria must not be spared

SAUDI OIL POLICY IN THE SERVICE OF U.S. INTERESTS


editor of *Al-Gomhouria*, who interviewed the King in Riyadh, reported that the King said he had repeated seven times in his conversation with Dr. Kissinger that «**the means at the disposal of the Saudi Arabian kingdom - is placed fully at the disposal of the battle so long as occupation of Arab territories and denial of Palestinian rights persist.**»

Dr. Kissinger was quoted as replying : «**The process of withdrawal from occupied territories, and other points raised, demand for their handling a period which is not short.**»

The King had commented : «**Provided there are sincere intentions you are capable of forcing Israel to withdraw immediately. The period of withdrawal could take no more than three weeks.**»

Dr. Kissinger had replied : «**Surely this requires months,**» but the King insisted : «**No. It can be brought about within three weeks.**»

On the question of Jerusalem, the King stated that the Jerusalem cause was above discussion and arguments, and he said he remained convinced that everything he had done was «**futile unless he could restore the Arabism of Jerusalem and got to pray in the Al-Aqsa mosque.**» It took Feisal's envoy, Sheikh Zaki Yamani, from October 17, 1973 to March 18, 1974 to force the Arab oil producing states to rescind their decision to boycott the U.S.A. and remove the



from an attack by which a part of her land should be occupied thereby getting her entangled with Israel. Otherwise, Syria would take up the gauntlet and attempt to «**fill the vacuum**» left by Egypt's abandonment of Arab nationalism ; 3) At the same time, the takeover of Gaza which is presently under Egyptian administration, and the takeover of the West Bank from Jordan are very important steps if we were to eliminate Palestinian ambitions and deprive them of a territorial base which they can use as a pretext to try to liberate Palestine. As a result, those outside of Palestine could no longer dream of returning and objectors could be easily hit in neighboring Arab states because no Arab state is prepared to bear the burden of fighting Israel alone. Besides, Palestinians could then be assimilated by the Arab states ; 4) the strengthening of Mulla Mustafa Barzani and his provision with the necessary means are essential to help him form a Kurdish government in northern Iraq, whose principal task would be to preoccupy any Arab government in Baghdad that would call for Arab unity north of our kingdom at present or in the future. This would be in consonance with a policy commenced last year by supplying arms and monies to Mustafa Barzani from within Iraq and via Turkey and Iran.

There is also a letter (dated December 3, 1972) from Kamal El-

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Adham. Feisal's principal advisor addressed to president Iryani of the Yemen Republic. It requests the president to remove his prime minister, Mr. Mohsen El-Aini, for falling into the trap of unity between north and south Yemen, without the precondition of eliminating marxism in the south. The letter also demands certain changes in army personnel, so that key positions could be maintained by anti-marxists in all departments of life in the Yemen. President Iryani gracefully complied and unity talks were suspended. A memorandum from the ministry of defense (September 16, 1970) was sent to the Commander of the Saudi forces in Jordan, and instructed him to place at the disposal of King Hussein all Saudi troops so that the King could use them in the impending struggle with the Palestinians. Hussein, did indeed, appreciate the «brotherly aid» received from Feisal in his celebrated «Black September» massacre of the Palestinian resistance movement (September 16-27, 1970).

Need we ask any further questions regarding the June war of 1967, its outcome, aftermath and prospective permanence? Should we wonder why King Feisal and president Sadat have become America's staunchest allies in the region in the aftermath of the October war «victory»? Must we seriously reflect on the obvious and expected plans of Feisal as he arms himself to the teeth with American, British and French weapons? We think not, and believe everything is clearer than clarity, but let us nevertheless take notice of this growing relationship and its ramifications.

Since America's plans for the Middle East are no secret, there is a need to refer rather than to dwell upon them. America wants the retention of its relative monopoly on the black gold of the Arab world, the continued and powerful existence of Israel, and the stability of the area under the leadership of pro-American regimes. The U.S. prefers not to intervene directly and militarily. Whenever an occasion presents itself, or in the words of Senator William Fulbright (May 21, 1973) «to secure our exposed 'jugular'», there are «militarily potent surrogates available in the region». Among the «surrogates», King Feisal rates only third next to the Shah of Iran and Israel. Consequently, the U.S. anticipated to sell its protege, Feisal, about a billion dollars worth of armaments in its latest program to bring him up to date with its military hardware. It therefore, sold him 19 U.S. warships, mostly destroyers and frigates to help him strengthen the Saudi naval influence in the Gulf region (Daily Star, Beirut, June 16, 1973). At roughly the same time, the Secretary of State, William Rogers, was testifying before Congress that

«Washington has no reason to doubt Saudi Assurances that F-4 phantom jet fighters sold to them would be used exclusively for their own defence». Rogers, according to the International Herald Tribune (June 6, 1973) was «attempting to defuse the issue as the Israelis are mounting an intensive behind-the-scenes diplomatic campaign to get the administration to reverse its announced willingness to sell phantom to the Saudis and possibly the Kuwaitis». The intended was for 24 to 30 phantoms! It wasn't long after, but at the height of the October war crisis, when the Times of London reported that (November 15, 1973): «The United States Air Force will supply F-5E jet fighters to Saudi Arabia in the New Year despite the Saudi's oil embargo, according to the authorita-

He wants to take no irrevocable anti-American action. He does not want to nationalize Aramco. His officials have summoned leaders of the American business community and told them that they, their persons and property, have nothing to fear. Elaborate security is provided. But the future American friend of Saudi Arabia - Saudi officials insists and American diplomats acknowledge - is going to have to be an American cured of Zionism. «There is no permanence in American support of Israel,» an official confidently claimed, «and we are going to change America.»

As regards Sheikh Yamani, Feisal's oil minister, the New York Times (November 28, 1973) reported the following: «Sheikh Yamani admits unabashedly in Arab company

of Arab oil reaching the United States by way of Caribbean refineries».

Finally when Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with the U.S. to obtain arms and technology, Newsweek (April 15, 1974 p. 23) highlighted the following points:

«The news startled even the most jaded veterans of oil diplomacy. Only weeks after bitterly denouncing Western European efforts to arrange separate economic and military agreements with the oil-rich Arab states, the U.S. last week unveiled a plan to vastly expand the flow of American arms and industrial equipment to Saudi Arabia. In one swift stroke, Washington thereby eliminated most of the tensions that have existed between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia since the October war in the Middle East. And at the same time, the new deal seemed to insure that in the future Saudi Arabia will be increasingly tied to the U.S.»


In order to «diversify» his sources of personnel and arms, Feisal also relies on the dependable British who have supplied him with «colonies of 2,000 advisors» who are «fanning out» to the five «far-flung» air bases in Saudi Arabia, which, «it is the sanguine hope, will suffice to defend the desert kingdom». In addition to personnel, the West has provided a historic and a contemporary air force, according to David Hirst of the Guardian (March 15, 1974, who elaborates:

«The British stake in Saudi Arabia is a very big one. Actually it was under a Labour Government that the basis was laid of what could be described as the most ambitious and important single enterprise that Britain is engaged upon anywhere in the world. In 1966 it sold Saudi Arabia, among other things, Lightning fighters, radar systems and the accompanying expertise.»

This, Britain's largest arms deal ever, was in effect an undertanking to create a fully fledged, self-sufficient Saudi air force. It had grown almost fortuitously out of higher Middle East politics.

This summer the arms deal was consolidated by another even bigger deal: a £250 million five-year contract to continue the job the first one had begun. Airwork, the first contractor, was replaced by BAC, the manufacturer of the Lightnings. The British, some say, are actually building the «third Saudi air force».

The first one was, so to speak, exclusively American. It ended when the Americans pulled out of their air base at Dahrhan; the second was a more or less do-it-alone Saudi affair. It foundered on the problems - technical, organizational, and cultural - that a recently Bedouin society, suddenly going supersonic could hardly avoid. Barely uncrated F-86s, rotting



tive journal Aviation Week. These will be the first of about a hundred F-5Es which are expected to be delivered.

«The F-5Es will be supplied under a £52m deal signed two years ago. The order was for 20 F5B trainers, which have been already delivered, and for 30 of the F5Es. These 30 are the aircraft which will start rolling into Saudi Arabia next year» - and Aviation Week states that orders for a further 70 are expected.

Meanwhile, David Hirst of the British Guardian reported Feisal's views on the war front (November 19, 1973):

«For Faisal, however offended, still wants to preserve his special relationship with America. His view of the world is still a Manichean one, Russia and communism represent evil, and if the U.S. is not good it is very much the lesser of two evils.» Feisal is trying to diversify his relations with Western countries - particularly a rehabilitated France and Britain - but for him the U.S. still appears to be the ultimate bastion against communism.

that he likes Americans, among whom he has studied and worked for many years (as a lawyer for Aramco)...

«More in sorrow than in anger, Sheikh Yamani asserts that most Americans do not recognize their real interests in the Middle East and have to be jolted into an awareness of the justice of Arab grievances against Israel and the importance to the world of Arab oil.

In contrast with Arab radicals, who are deeply suspicious of United States 'imperialist' designs in the Middle East, Sheikh Yamani believes that no American «sense of fair play» will aid the Arabs, once they make their case heard.»

And the good oil minister of Aramco gave an interview to the Los Angeles Times (International Herald Tribune, January 18, 1974) who commented that: «The selective oil boycott has been futile. It has been obvious to oil company insiders for months that the major firms were juggling their oil-supply systems to compensate the Netherlands and the United States for the stoppage by the Arabs, and there have been reports

LATIN AMERICA

near runways are its still visible legacy.

The «third air force» is a kind of compromise between its two predecessors. It is really a Saudi-British air force, with a hefty American element thrown in. The Saudis are in charge, but they have brought in foreign servicing and expertise on such a scale that were they suddenly withdrawn there would not be much air force left.

Besides the Americans, British and the Japanese Johnnies-comelately, the French made enormous strides under the new Feisal dispensation. An **Nahar** of Beirut, was the first newspaper to report the planned 800 million tons of oil deal for arms and industrial equipment between France and Saudi Arabia (January 8, 1974). The **Sunday Times** (January 13, 1974) blew the lid of the deal: «Despite many government denials over the past three months, during which negotiations have proceeded, the French are almost certain to supply massive amounts of arms in exchange for some 800m tons of oil over 20 years.»

The arms the French will supply include 38 Mirage 3E deep penetration bombers, French AM 30 tanks, and the French Crotale (rattlesnake) ground-to-air missile for use against low-flying aircraft. This will be in addition to industrial investment including arms servicing plants and refineries.

Meanwhile, in expectation of the big oil-for-arms deal the French have signed a preliminary pilot agreement for 30m tons of crude oil over the next three years. At present France gets 30m tons of Saudi oil a year, rather less than a quarter of her 130m ton annual consumption.

French Foreign Ministry officials say that this pilot agreement is totally different from the politically-significant government negotiated deal. It is just a company-to-company agreement, negotiated by Pierre Guillaumat, head of the state-owned oil company Elf-Erap, together with another state-backed oil group the CFP-Total Oil company.

Sheikh Yamani, the Saudi Oil Minister also described this as «Just a little agreement.» The French add obliquely that Sheikh Yamani was not party to the French big deal discussions «because he has rather too close links with the American Saudi consortium Aramco.»

Lastly, when the foreign minister of France, Mr. Jobert, visited Saudi Arabia in late January of 1974, the Arab King, Moslem Caliph and America's Sultan of Sultans in Arabia, King Feisal told him: «I expect the maximum from France.» The French minister replied: «Oui Monsieur Le Roi!»



ARGENTINE : WILL THE MILITARY COME BACK ?

With the death of Juan Peron, Argentina returns to the previous crisis that called for his return. The forces that saw in the «returning savior» the only chance to stop the growing tide of change led by the struggles of the workers and students realize more than ever that the danger of not having a «non-military» regime for sometime is more than ever present.

The «returning savior» was not capable of dealing with the problems of Argentina in any way that would silence the struggle of the workers - students' front, and at the same time end the armed struggle that is led by the different revolutionary movements. Hence Peron had to resort to oppression in order to achieve his aim in establishing «law and order». Under the claim that it was defending the «interest of the people» and the constitution, the regime filled the prisons with revolutionary militants, closed down newspapers, outlawed public demonstrations, banned political activity at the university and limited the right to strike. Peronist «democracy» crowned its activities when the regime overthrew the government of the province of Cordoba.

Peron even failed to contain the leftist revolutionary faction within his own movements, and as such had to liquidate many of the democratic and socialist peronists, specially when they opposed his economic policy which aimed at solving the growing inflation on the account of the interests and rights of the working class. In fact, the contradiction between Peron and some of his supporters reached to a level where he threatened to resign if his policies were not supported. The problem with the 78 years old «returning savior» was his inability to realize that the years of the 50's, when he could have convinced the working class to pay the price for his economic policy, are since a long time gone. Hence his maneuvers to es-

CHILE - ISRAEL

Strengthen Relations

Already since the Frei regime, Chile was the country in Latin America that had the highest military expenses per capita.

Earlier, mainly defensive weapons were purchased, a situation that now, under the fascist Pinochet regime, has changed into one of buying light weapons to be used against the struggling Chilean people as well as heavy defensive military equipment.

Among the weapons that the junta recently have bought for 200 million dollars from the US, are two destroyers, two submarines and an unknown amount of Phantom jets. It should be noted that the selling of some of this equipment need special permission from the president of the US.

But the fascist Pinochet junta, which has now also officially taken complete control of the country in order to keep up «law and order», that is suppress the Chilean people as much as possible particularly by military and political means, is not content by buy weapons from one imperialist state; it has also taken up contacts with Israel in order to buy weapons. So far Uzi machine-guns have been used by the Pinochet regime to shed Chilean blood, and other arms are being shipped into the ports of Chile from Israel.

Moreover, the junta has made deals with Britain and Italy to buy missile boats and with Spain and France to get other kind of military equipment.

This fascist regime has thus lately made arms deals amounting to some 500 million dollars worth of light and heavy weaponry, weapons of a kind that are used against the Chilean as well as against the Palestine peoples.

Some time ago, Peru put forward a proposal that all the countries of Latin America should freeze their weaponry escalation, a proposal that outraged both the Chilean and the Brazilian fascist regimes, which now under the Pinochet junta have re-established connections.

tablish atmospheres of national unity and general interest» failed.

Contrary to expectations, the military in Argentina came back to political life after a year of absence. The comeback was an attempt to curtail the growing armed struggle operations. The reason why the military was kept out for a whole year was the attempt to give an impression on the part of the new regime that it would be capable of governing without the strong interference of the «brass class». The deteriorating economic conditions and the pressure from the capitalist class and the imperialist companies forced Peron to call on the military earlier than he had planned. Foreign companies threatened to move to more «stable countries» like Brasil and Uruguay if Peron did not give more power to the military to keep «law and order».

One week before Peron's death, his supporters celebrated the first anniversary of his return. At the same time revolutionary organizations celebrated the event by carrying out 4 attacks on offices of imperialist companies.

The expectations that Peron would be able to stop the revolutionary tide once he returned were never realized. As a result the extreme right, particularly the military, began searching for other alternatives which they would be able to achieve their aims. Hence rumors among the big capitalist class were that the old man is not the same any more, and that there should be a change. Peron's death came at a time that saved him the agony of facing what remained of his supporters. His wife who officially succeeded him is not expected to lead the ship in any better way, but on the contrary the expectations are that the «right» will give the full power back to the military hoping that they will be capable of achieving better «results» than the last Peronist experience.



OUR UNDERSTANDING
OF THE P.L.O.
PROGRAM

Following is the statement of acceptance of the new P.L.O. Provisional Program, made by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine at the 12th Palestine National Council, held in Cairo between June 1st and 9th, 1974.

It is the concern of the PFLP to come out of this meeting with a unified position, which is fundamental for this critical stage and for our unity in the future. We have felt, as have other brothers in this Council, that this unity has been threatened, but we have tried to safeguard it even at times when a lack of discipline and concern regarding the basic issues was felt. It is worth asking: Why have we held this position? Why are we so concerned? The answer lies in the essence of the political position. It is clear that the discussions, which can be considered in the final analysis the position adopted here, can be summarized in the following points:

1. The rejection of the Security Council Resolution 242 is a final and resolved issue to the Palestinian struggle, regardless of the various wording and terminology because it leads to the liquidation of our revolution and our cause.

2. So, our rejection to participate in the Geneva Conference is a very clear position that we hold to, in order to protect our people's movement from falling prey to the settlements, that aim at ending our armed struggle and our existence.

3. All of the above mean that the revolution cannot be part of the negotiated settlement and what stand behind it.

4. The national authority that we all struggle to achieve is a true national authority which cannot be the result of what is going on these days, but can only be achieved through armed struggle and the mass political struggle linked to it.

5. The reactionary puppet regime of Jordan is a main participant in the conspiracy and as such we refuse the United Kingdom plan, and any coordination with the regime. This crystal clear and final position cannot be subjected to any other interpretation. Hence, the struggle to establish a national democratic regime in Jordan is one of the main tasks in our provisional program.

This is our comprehension and understanding of the unified Palestinian position which we struggle to achieve regardless of the difficulties and obstacles we will face.

In the light of this comprehension we declare our acceptance of the ten points adopted by the Political Committee, and the paragraph which was added to them.



ARAB SOCIALIST WORK PARTY CONDEMNS
DISENGAGEMENT ON SYRIAN FRONT

«Disengagement on the Syrian-Israeli front is another chapter of the imperialist-reactionary conspiracy»

The Arab Socialist Workers Party (Syrian branch) issued a statement on the disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel. The following are excerpts from the statement:

«The disengagement accord is another chapter of the imperialist-reactionary conspiracy, this international conspiracy that aims at re-imposing imperialist control on the Arab region, securing recognition of the Zionist state, and safeguarding imperialist interests in the region.

«The accord sanctions the results of the 1967 aggression, which imply a de facto recognition of the right of the enemy state to exist, and consequently to continue to usurp the land of Palestine.

«The disengagement agreement, the end of armed battles with the enemy, the American promise to aid Syria with 100 million dollars, and the visits of Kissinger and Nixon prove that the October war despite the great sacrifices and great efficiency shown in it, was conceived by its planners (capitulating Arab regimes and leaders) as a limited tactical operation to break the dead lock of the political settlement and deceive the Arab masses.

«A major crime is being committed now against the interests of the Syrian people and the rest of the Arab people, particularly the Palestinians, who are struggling to establish a secular democratic state on all of the Palestinian soil. The Syrian regime has made humiliating concessions to the enemy, by agreeing to the demilitarization of part of the homeland (the Golan Heights), which undercuts national sovereignty over it.

«The Syrian regime has renounced the true slogans of the national revolutionary movement, that truly considers American imperialism as enemy No 1 of the struggling peoples of the world. Instead, the pillars of the Syrian regime, following in the footsteps of Egypt's rulers, are sounding the trumpet of the biggest imperialist power in the world praising Kissinger and warmly welcoming Nixon.

«The Syrian national movement and the Syrian people are aware of their commitments to the liberation of Palestine... and that the disengagement agreement on the Syrian front means in practical terms a disengagement of the commitment of the Syrian regime to the Palestinian cause.

«In accepting the cease-fire of last October, the Syrian government had made two conditions, which were:

1. A pledge of Israeli withdrawal from all occupied lands and a timetable of this withdrawal.
2. Restoration of the national rights of the Palestinians.

But the provisions of the agreement did not make any reference to these conditions. On the contrary, reports said that an oral Syrian promise was given to curtail Palestinian resistance activities from the Syrian borders.

«All this goes to show that a real conspiracy is being carried out against the interests of the Syrian people, the rest of the Arab people, and particularly the Palestinians.»



The Central Information Committee of the PFLP issued these colored Stamps on the 2nd anniversary of the martyrdom of comrade Ghassan Kanafani. The set is available in Arabic, English, French, Spanish and Swedish. Cost of set is U.S. \$ 50.

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