PFLP BULLETIN
Dec. 1981 No. 57

NO TO YAHAD'S PLAN
"One of the major reasons for the formation of the PFLP was the class perspective we gave the Palestinian and Arab struggle. Through experience we learned that the most oppressed classes – the workers, peasants, sections of the petit bourgeoisie, the Palestinians living in the refugee camps – are the ones most in contradiction with the imperialist, Zionist and reactionary alliance. It is they who carve history with determination that can persevere in this protracted war without wavering.”

Comrade George Habash

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is a Marxist-Leninist organization that is an integral part of the Palestinian Resistance and the Arab national liberation movement. The Bulletin is the English language magazine of the PFLP. It has been published monthly since March 1979 with the following aims:

- presenting the political line of the PFLP
- providing current information and analysis of the Palestinian liberation struggle, as well as developments in the Arab world and on the international level
- serving as a tool for building solidarity with progressive organizations, parties, national liberation movements and countries around the world

Subscribing to the PFLP Bulletin is one way you can support these aims; so is encouraging comrades and friends to read and subscribe to the Bulletin. Another means for supporting our work is to write to us with your evaluations, suggestions and criticism concerning the Bulletin. In addition, back issues are available upon request. Of particular interest are these back issues which contain major PFLP policy statements of current relevance:

PFLP Bulletin No. 33 features a comprehensive interview with Comrade George Habash, General Secretary, on the how and why of the PFLP’s emergence in the context of the Arab National Movement and the Palestinian struggle. In this interview, Comrade Habash also deals with the question of transforming a petit bourgeois nationalist organization into a Marxist-Leninist party.

PFLP Bulletin No. 42 contains a document on the relations between the PLO and the Jordanian regime, including our reasons for opposing these relations, and supplemented by the text of the “Framework for the joint work between the PLO and Jordan”.

PFLP Bulletin No. 52 contains a summary of the results of the PFLP’s 4th National Congress.

This issue features:
- Occupied Homeland: West Bank protests; resistance in the Golan Heights; repression in the Zionist state; continuation of resistance leaders discussion; Palestinian literature festival.
- Lebanon: Interview with Communist Action Organization; anniversary of the Communist Party; Lebanese Association for Popular Action.
- The AWACS package: who benefits?

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This issue was sent to press November 15, 1981.
EDITORIAL

NO TO FAHD’S PLAN

As we go to press, it remains uncertain whether or not Prince Fahd’s eight-point plan will be placed on the agenda of the Arab summit scheduled to open in Fez, Morocco, on November 25th. Yet whether or not it appears on the official agenda, the promotion of this plan represents a new phase of the enemy’s attempts to impose a capitulationist settlement in the area. Thus, defeating the Fahd plan has become the focus of the Palestinian and Arab liberation forces’ political struggle in this period.

The scope of this struggle is not limited to this particular summit or its outcome, for in truth the Saudi rulers do not count on their plan being implemented as it now stands. Rather its introduction is the prelude to a series of maneuvers and developments, not excluding armed confrontations, that would allow Arab reaction as a bloc to enter the imperialist settlement. This is why we term Fahd’s plan Camp David II, and this is why we call on all those who have opposed Camp David to continue the struggle against all its offspring.

By presenting a series of points which could never be implemented under the prevailing regional and international balance of power, the plan aims at planting illusions in the minds of some. The Saudi princes hope to engulf the patriotic forces, and the Palestinian Revolution in particular, in circular arguments about the benefits and drawbacks of the individual points proposed. In this way, divisions would be created within the Palestinian Resistance; further divisions would arise between the Resistance and the forces that support it and among these forces themselves. Political disarray in the patriotic camp would cover Arab reaction’s moves towards Camp David, just as Sadat visited Jerusalem under the cover of heated debate over whether or not the October War and its aftermath had created conditions conducive to a just peace. Internal divisions would also weaken the Palestinian Revolution in the face of the Zionist/reactionary aggression that has been part of every attempt to impose a ‘peaceful’ solution.

However, the Palestinian Resistance organizations as well as patriotic and progressive forces on the Arab level have rallied to stop the materialization of the reactionary objectives. The PFLP, DFLP, Saiqa, Arab Liberation Front, PFLP-General Command, Popular Struggle Front, Palestinian Liberation Front and significant sectors of Fatah have openly declared their rejection of the Fahd plan. The patriotic forces in occupied Palestine have also stated their opposition. Yet to decisively stop the Fahd plan and its intended consequences, a firm official stand is called for on the part of the PLO. It is on this basis that the Palestinian Revolution can expect active support from its allies on the Arab and international level.

As an important component of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, the PLO can be instrumental in blocking this plan from the summit agenda. Conversely, if the plan reaches the agenda, this will be the first time an Arab summit officially addresses the question of recognizing and legitimizing the Zionist state, i.e. the occupation of Palestine. This in itself would mark a great victory for the enemy strategy, whereby ‘Israel’ applies its military might until Arab reaction is reduced to crawling and begging for peace — with imperialism reaping all the benefits. For the progressive forces to allow such a situation is the same as failing to take advantage of the polarization represented by Sadat’s execution, and instead allowing the enemy alliance to ease in the second phase of Camp David, with a new face in Egypt, Mubarak, beckoning other Arab reactionaries into the imperialist-Zionist fold.

The intentions of the Fahd plan come even more sharply into focus when compared and contrasted with the reality of the present situation. Saudi reaction has moved boldly at a time when the partners to Camp David are openly floundering in their efforts to implement and expand the accords. The carefully worded statement issued after the recent meeting, where ‘Israel’ and Egypt tried to reactivate the ‘autonomy’ talks, cannot hide the fact that there is yet no viable political plan for resolving the major obstacles, particularly the Palestinian issue.

At this point, the Saudis offer the olive branch to the Zionist enemy, against whom they declared jihād just one year ago, and are generously rewarded by the Reagan Administration in the form of AWACS. Zionist propaganda to the contrary, all facts confirm that the AWACS do not represent a military threat to ‘Israel’; their sale is primarily a political gesture to boost Saudi prestige and thus encourage Arab conciliation with ‘Israel’. (See article in this issue for further comment on the AWACS.) The Saudis for their part have clearly indicated the US as the leading force in bringing about a ‘peaceful’ settlement. While the Saudi position is consistent with the reality of the regime’s class interests, it is totally incongruent with the reality experienced by the Arab people at large. At this moment, literally thousands of American soldiers are pouring onto Arab shores in Operation Bright Star, aimed at testing the ability of the Rapid Deployment Force to intervene in our area. This show of force and the open collaboration of the regimes in Oman, Egypt, Sudan and Somalia, where the war games are being staged, directly threaten the security and well-being of the Arab masses. In this context, we can see the overall regional implications of the Fahd plan against the Arab masses, for this plan aims at bringing all the Arab countries within the imperialist orbit. It is no wonder that Secretary of State Haig has pointed out the positive aspect of the plan — Arab recognition of ‘Israel’ — for this represents an essential step in forging the “strategic consensus” envisioned by US imperialism.

Another of Fahd’s aims is synchronizing the Arab-position with the European initiative in order to integrate both within US imperialism’s framework. This is another indication of the plan’s function as Camp David II. The willingness of certain European countries to participate in the US dominated “peace-keeping” force for the Sinai reemphasizes their support for US plans and that their initiative is but a supplement to Camp David. Moreover, this will mark a return to old-style colonial conditions with soldiers from the imperialist countries patrolling Arab land, in this case around the strategic Suez Canal.

A particularly significant reality this month is the renewed Israeli military build-up in South Lebanon. Cushioned by its strategic collaboration agreement with the US, the Zionists are massing troops in Sa‘ad Haddad’s border strip and resuming their creeping annexation of Lebanese land by fencing off areas and building new roads and enclaves, etc. Thus, the Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese Patriotic Movement are facing a dual threat: the Saudi political attack and Israeli military aggression. The Zionists know very well that South Lebanon is to be discussed at the Fez Summit, and they are signalling Arab reaction to steer the discussion in the direction of curtailing the activities of the patriotic forces, be it the Resistance, the LPM or Syria. At the same time, the Zionist military build-up is a very real preparation for the renewal of aggression.
The Palestinian national unity forged in 1977 and the solid relations with the LPM protected the revolution against the Zionist invasion of March 1978, and turned the July 1981 aggression into a partial victory for the revolution, demonstrating our ability to stand firm and inflict losses on the Zionist entity. Today an equally firm and united stand against the political maneuvers represented by the Fahd initiative is a prerequisite for withstanding the new round of Zionist aggression which is sure to come, and for continuing the liberation struggle in order to build a new democratic society in Palestine.

ARAB PEOPLES CONFERENCE

An extraordinary session of the Arab Peoples Conference (APC) is scheduled to be convened before the November 25th Arab Summit at Fez. The APC consists of political parties and organizations, syndicates, trade unions and popular institutions, and as such is a forum for projecting the will of the Arab masses. For this reason it is of particular importance that it is meeting before the Arab Summit, and will be able to prepare a working paper to present to the official leaders in Fez. This working paper will be presented by a delegation from the APC, including representatives from the Palestinian resistance, and will reflect the position of the masses on major current events, from the execution of Sadat to the joint imperialist/reactionary military maneuvers (Right Star). It is expected that the working paper will clearly state the mass rejection of the Fahd plan as being against the interests of the Palestinian and Arab masses, and simply an attempt to weaken the patriotic and progressive forces while expanding imperialist, Zionist and reactionary domination in the area.

OCCUPIED HOMELAND

Implementation of the Israeli plan for civil administration in the West Bank and Gaza Strip began on November 1st, when Menahem Milson took up the post of civilian governor of the occupied territories. Already the Zionist authorities' own actions have exposed the fraudulent nature of this project. Defense Minister Sharon had been lavish with public promises to minimize Israeli military presence and 'democratize' the occupation. However, as expected, when the Palestinians exercised their right to political expression, the facade of liberalization was torn from the Sharon plan, while the iron fist of Zionist occupation remained.

MILITANT REJECTION OF ALL CONSPIRACIES

The beginning of November brought a series of militant demonstrations in many cities and villages throughout the West Bank, as the Palestinian population reacted with outrage to the attempts to implement 'autonomy' under the pretext of civil administration. Another spark for the protests was the anniversary of the infamous

EDUCATION:
A RIGHT,
NOT A PRIVILEGE

BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY

the right
to education
is a basic human right
birzeit university should be reopened!
Balfour declaration, when British colonialism gave official sanction to the Zionist project in Palestine. Sixty-four years later the Palestinian masses were determined to show that just as they had rejected the Balfour declaration, they continue to reject all imperialist, Zionist and reactionary plots.

On November 2nd, in Jerusalem, thousands of Palestinians joined the massive demonstrations, chanting slogans and carrying signs protesting the Israeli occupation and confirming their allegiance to their sole legitimate representative, the PLO. In Ramallah and al Bireh, the demonstrators headed towards the entrances of the towns and the main streets, where they burned tires and set up barricades. The droves of heavily armed police and security forces trying to break up the demonstrations were met with a hail of stones.

In Nablus, many school students were arrested following student strikes and protests against the occupation and the 'autonomy' plan. Occupation forces encircled the Al Haj Ma'azouz Al Masri boys school and the Fadwa Touqan girls school in an attempt to prevent demonstrations. Meanwhile, a general strike was declared. All stores, schools and public places were closed, while transportation facilities stopped for many hours.

A huge popular rally was held at the Al Najah National University, attended by representatives of patriotic institutions and municipalities in the occupied territories. Speakers condemned the 'autonomy' plan, the civilian administration project and the Zionist-sponsored village leagues. During the rally, cables of support were received from Ramallah mayor Karim Khalaf and al Bireh mayor Ibrahim al Tawil. A statement from the Bethlehem student council was read out, confirming the students' support for the rally's resolutions and Palestinian national unity. The participants in the rally issued a statement outlining the dangerous implications of the civilian administration project and other suspect schemes.

Militant protests and demonstrations continued into November, spreading to other villages and camps throughout the West Bank. All reflected one unified theme: No to the occupation, be it under civil or military guise! No to the 'autonomy' plan! Yes to the PLO!

The Zionist response

While the most important aspect of the current uprising is people's determination to militantly reject all conspiracies, the protests also served to definitively rip the mask from the civil administration project. The Zionist occupation is based on brute force and total repression of our people's national will. Any attempts to legitimize it, be they through 'autonomy' or civilian rule, are doomed to failure, as the Palestinian people will resist occupation under any name. And when confronted with resistance, the Zionists drop the facade of liberalisation, and their true violent, racist and expansionist goals are revealed for the world to see.

The Zionist response to the recent protests has come on two levels. One is the brute force directed against our masses in the course of the demonstrations, including clubbings, tear gas, the storming of schools, and culminating with the shooting of a 15 year old Palestinian high school student in Jenin during a demonstration. The other is planned, systematic punishment against patriotic institutions and individuals, whether they were directly involved in events or not. This second tactic is aimed not only at stopping the current protests, but also at undermining our people's ability to resist in the long term, by depriving them of patriotic centers and leadership. Thus on November 4th, the authorities closed down Bir Zeit University until January 4th. After the order to close the university, Zionist troops literally invaded the campus, arresting students and confiscating ID cards. (It is interesting to note that this is in direct contradiction with Sharon's new guidelines for the military in the occupied territories, as he stated that there would be no more attacks on educational institutions.) Bethlehem University was temporarily closed down by a student strike, and surrounded by Israeli troops, who declared it a "military area".

Individuals arrested on charges of inciting the population to riot include the deputy rector of Bir Zeit University, the heads of both the Lawyers and Doctors Union and the Engineers Association and a member of the al Bireh local council. The patriotic press has also been attacked; the editor of Al Shaab was arrested, and Al Fajr newspaper was closed down for 10 days. Nablus mayor Bassam Shakaa was banned from travelling to the Netherlands, where he had been invited to meet Dutch politicians.

Deaths of political prisoners

The true face of the occupation has been most clearly revealed in the Zionist prisons, where thousands of Palestinian prisoners face torture and harsh conditions because of their determination to struggle against the occupiers of their land.

The recent protests in the occupied territories were also sparked by the anger caused by the suspicious deaths of five Palestinian prisoners within the period of September 14th to October 26th. In all the cases, the families, friends and fellow prisoners of the martyrs claim that they died as a result of torture. This claim is no surprise, as the use of torture in Zionist prisons has been well-documented by such diverse sources as the London Sunday Times, the National Lawyers Guild, Amnesty International and former US State Department employee Alexandra Johnson, as well as the testimony of numerous former prisoners.

Twenty-two year old Kayed Abdel Fattah, from the West Bank village of Bani Na'im, died on October 26th. His death came shortly after that of Fayed Abdel Tariyeh, a 23 year old student from al Khalil, who had been arrested on suspicion of guerrilla activity but never brought to trial. He died, according to the autopsy report, of a cerebral hemorrhage in Tel Hashomer hospital on October 23rd. While the Israeli authorities claim that this was the result of a blood disease, his family states that the hemorrhage came from the brutal beatings he sustained in prison.

Ali Shatrit, from Halhoul, died on October 19th in Ashkelon prison. Just a month before, another Palestinian political prisoner, Salah Ali Al Bass, also died in the notorious Ashkelon prison. Both are believed to have been tortured to death. The fifth martyr is Jihadi Abu Audeh, from Beit Hanoun, who died in Gaza prison on October 12th. His death aroused a wave of angry protest in the prison and throughout the Gaza Strip. Mass rallies have also been held in the West Bank, condemning the deaths and the Zionist policies that cause them.
ISSUES OF PATRIOTIC STRUGGLE

Majed Abu Sharrar, member of the Central Committee of Fateh

There is no doubt that Palestinian-Jordanian relations took the form of a violent contradiction. The Jordanian regime is the only Arab regime that is still trying to undermine the PLO's representation of the Palestinian people or at least share that representation with the PLO. It is the one that is placing serious obstacles in front of escalating the struggle in the occupied territories. It is not alone in this line, but it is the most efficient. The Jordanian regime is also the only Arab regime that has political bases in the occupied territories that it can move and direct according to its own interests in every stage of the struggle. Therefore, we see the relationship with the Jordanian regime as tactical, one that we must aim at using to serve the process of the struggle. We must not doubt for one minute that the Jordanian regime, for its part, understands the relationship in a different way.

Concerning the dialogue with the Jordanian regime, there is no doubt that the return of the Palestinian Resistance to its bases in the East Bank of the Jordan River is a goal that merits serious daily struggle. The 14th PNC decided to begin the dialogue with Jordan, with the restrictions placed on this dialogue. No one registered their reservations on the resolution except the brothers in the PFLP. During the period between the 14th and 15th PNC, the dialogue with the Jordanian regime took place. I think that brother Yasser Abed Rabbo has participated in part of it. During the dialogue, the Jordanian regime refused to agree to any form of serious measures that would facilitate the struggle in the occupied territories. The Jordanian partner refused to give the Palestinian partner the right to represent the Palestinians who are living in the East Bank. They said that these are Jordanians, and that Jordanian law applies to them. There is no doubt that the final goal of this behavior is to weaken the position of the PLO in the occupied territories. This is a logical thing, and is consistent with Jordanian strategy, which is aimed at striking the right of the PLO to represent the Palestinian people and restoring the regime's domination over the Palestinian people, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, if that is possible.

We can say that in the recent session of the PNC we did not give the Executive Committee the mandate granted in the 14th PNC. The 15th PNC held the Jordanian partner responsible for the failure of the dialogue. The PNC also promised to support the patriotic forces in Jordan in their struggle to prevent the regime from joining Camp David. The PNC authorized the Executive Committee to use all means of struggle to guarantee whatever facilitates the work of the Palestinian Revolution from the East Bank of the Jordan River. Even so, we must not commit a mistake and believe for one moment that this regime will be sincere in giving any facilities to the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The aim of the regime is to contain the Palestinian political position, and to dominate and strike the PLO. Here I still remember a delegation of which I was a member. The delegation went to Jordan in October 1973, during the war, to ask the Jordanian government to allow 100 guerrillas to pass to the West Bank. We sat 5 hours with Rifai, then prime minister, without succeeding in persuading the regime to allow one guerrilla to pass to the West Bank. As this regime refused this request at a time when the Arab world was fighting Israel, how could it give us facilities that would strengthen our stand, in competition with the regime, in normal times? This is a point that we must be aware of and base our policies on. The relationship with the Jordanian regime contains a basic contradiction on the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Mohammed Khalifeh, representative of Saiqa in the PLO Executive Committee

We must not isolate the position from the circumstances under which the decision is taken. The dialogue had a clear goal, which was not to allow the Jordanian regime to join Camp David, by using friendly dialogue at one point and pressure at another. During the propaganda campaigns (against the dialogue), there were some indications that King Hussein might join Camp David, and that therefore the dialogue should be stopped. That is to say, pressure should be used instead of political dialogue. That is the first point, that we should not separate the position from the surrounding political circumstances.

The second point that I would like to discuss is the dialogue itself. The dialogue has not been stopped up to now, which is very dangerous, as the regime is still determined to inform all Arab and international partners that it will not allow one guerrilla into Jordan. The regime's position on the role and future of the PLO is clear and firm. In turn, we must have our clear and principled position, although we need to conduct some dialogue at certain times.

With respect to the relationship with the Jordanian regime, I remember that this question was discussed after the Rabat Summit, where King Hussein was forced to recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the body responsible for the future of the Palestinian territories under occupation, including the West Bank. But Jordan did not move from the position of verbal recognition to taking any practical measures until the 9th Arab summit in 1978 (in Baghdad), where it took a stand against the Camp David accords, and the Palestinian-Jordanian Joint Committee was formed.

In my opinion, the Palestinian side in the Joint Committee did not take a firm stand to make use of the situation (the regime's rejection of Camp David). In other words, it did not achieve the maximum capacity for work in Jordan, such as freedom of political work and releasing the prisoners who are in the jails of the Jordanian regime.

The task of the Joint Committee is to support the steadfastness of the masses in the occupied territories. We know that this is a very important question because Israeli policy is aimed at destroying the patriotic institutions, such as the municipal councils. Through the
Joint Committee it is possible to provide support, and in reality some of the patriotic institutions were supported in this way. During the last 3 years the Jordanian regime has managed to make use of the committee to strengthen the positions of its supporters, so as to interfere in the internal affairs of these institutions.

Another point is that the Palestinian partner should consist of people who are familiar with the situation in the occupied territories. For example, there should be a program for agricultural and industrial development, which the Joint Committee bases its work on. Of course a basic part of the assistance should be directed to supporting the patriotic forces that have a distinguished role in confronting the enemy.

The above-mentioned tasks were adopted by the PNC, and what is needed is a commitment to them.

Abu Ali Mustafa, Deputy General Secretary of the PFLP

So as to avoid repetition regarding our position on the relationship with the Jordanian regime, we should address the question seriously without trying to justify the critical position that the PLO put itself in during the process of the dialogue.

Although tactics are legitimate and understandable in any relation between two forces whose relationship is based on extreme contradictions, it is imperative that the political leadership calculates the benefits gained from such tactics. We must not consider ourselves clever and capable of using tactics, while thinking that the Jordanian regime is not doing the same thing. I think that we must determine the benefits that the regime gains from the relationship with us, so as to be able to judge the results. What has happened is that we have avoided this point, and considered that the conditions put forth by the PNC are sufficient.

I disagree with comrade Mohammed Khalifeh on the point that we were looking for means to prevent the Jordanian regime from joining Camp David. I do not think that the Arab decision or the relationship with the PLO were the things that prevented the regime from joining Camp David. There are objective conditions from which the regime cannot escape by taking a subjective decision to join Camp David. It is these conditions that caused Jordan not to be a partner in Camp David. Even US diplomats, including Brzezinski have stated that they understand the Jordanian position, i.e. that they understand the 'wait and see' policy of the regime. The Jordanian regime is waiting for the conditions to become more favorable. It is waiting for Israel to give it a share in the settlement, and it is waiting on US policy, as the US is proceeding step by step with the settlement so as not to push the whole region to an explosive state that US policy could not tolerate. Finally the Jordanian regime is waiting for the removal of the Palestinian obstacle, which is present in Lebanon. The removal of this obstacle will open the way for the Jordanian regime to strike Syria, which is opposing Camp David and restricting the maneuvers of Jordan. Due to the fact that Syria is adjacent to Jordan, that regime cannot be free of Syrian political, geographical, moral and material influence when taking its political decisions. It is all these factors that have led the Jordanian regime, acting in its own interests, not to enter Camp David.

The resolution of the Baghdad Summit, which was agreed upon by all the Arab countries, gave the Jordanian regime a needed economic and political cover and made it a co-partner in the Palestinian patriotic decision under the pretext of distributing the money for steadfastness. These are the reasons for the resolution in Baghdad — not support for the Palestinian people. As these Arab regimes had recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, why did the Baghdad Summit consider Jordan as our co-partner in distributing the $150 million? This decision came so as to pave the way for the Jordanian regime to strike the Rabat decision itself (recognition of the PLO). It is in this light that we consider the tactics used by the leadership of the PLO as losing ones.

Here we must note that the activities of those loyal to the regime, after the establishment of the relationship, were greater than in the period before 1977. The Jordanian regime profited from the cover that was given to its elements in the occupied territories; they were able to say: Why are we accused of relating to the regime when the leadership of the PLO has established relations with it? The leadership of the PLO did not dare announce one position — neither in the press nor in its statements — against the 'royal decision', issued in mid-November 1980, to establish a ministerial committee to be in charge of the affairs of the occupied territories. Why was there this silence?

Concerning supporting the steadfastness of our people in the occupied territories, we think it is possible to find special means to provide this support if we program it to include defending the land and industry, developing agriculture, protecting culture and education, and other tasks that can be collectively shouldered by the leadership of the revolution. I do not think that if we close the channel between the Jordanian regime and the PLO leadership, we would face obstacles that cannot be overcome or that would prevent our support from reaching our masses under occupation.

I would like to give some examples to illustrate how the steadfastness funds are actually distributed. There is the project of Ibrahim Abu Sitteh in the Gaza Strip. I cannot see that this project, which is being supported with thousands of Jordanian dinars, is innocent in the political sense. This project is being supported while restrictions are being imposed on patriotic institutions such as the Bir Zeit Student Union or that of Bethlehem. I do not understand why Bassam Shakas spends days and weeks waiting in Amman before he is given assistance, while other mayors are helped on their arrival, with no delay. Such things do not occur without a political basis.

Ultimately, we do not think that it is in the interest of the future of the struggle of our masses and the protection of the patriotic Palestinian decision to continue this relationship. We do not see that there is any legitimate reason to maintain it, whether it is called...
dialogue or a relationship through joint committees. This is especially true because the new situation created in ‘Israel’ after the Likud electoral victory will allow the Jordanian regime a longer time for maneuvering than before.

Mohammed Khalifeh, representative of Saiqa in the PLO Executive Committee

I would like to make it clear that when I pointed out that the PLO began the dialogue so as to halt the moves of the regime to join Camp David, I did not consider that the only factor. I agree with Abu Ali about the other factors, and I do not ignore the role of the PLO. I would like to add another point: we conducted the dialogue with the regime and ignored supporting the Jordanian patriotic forces. This is a mistake that the PLO committed.

Yasser Abed Rabbo, Deputy General Secretary of the DFLP

It is known to all of us that the Camp David accords have pushed the Arab reactionaries into a critical situation. Our role was and still is to manipulate this situation so as to worsen this crisis, not to ease it. From this perspective we dealt with the problems after Camp David. We did not have any illusions about the long-term political aims of the Jordanian regime regarding annexing the occupied land or usurping the right of the PLO to represent the Palestinian people, especially in the occupied territories. This was not the problem at all. We tried to deal with the role and position of the Palestinian partner in the dialogue and the Joint Committee. In other words, we wanted to at least correct the role of the Palestinian partner in the dialogue so as to block the attempts of the Jordanian regime to strengthen its influence in the occupied territories.

We have considered this a task that has its consequences in the occupied territories, in Jordan and on the Arab level. The problem lies, now and then, in the role and position of the Palestinian partner in dealing with this relationship. It does not lie in whether we do or do not realize the real intentions of the Jordanian partner, either at the current time or in the long run.

Mayor Basam Shakaa of Nablus being welcomed back to the West Bank. Why do patriotic leaders spend days and weeks waiting in Amman for approval of their projects?

We dealt with the question from this perspective before and during the PNC. I think that the discussion was more advanced during the PNC, because it dealt with the details of the previous experience with both the political relationship and the Joint Committee. In the PNC we laid the basis that we think is needed to correct the relationship within the Joint Committee.

We understand that the task of this committee is to support the steadfastness of the masses. Therefore it must carry out a policy to confront the enemy’s measures to expropriate the land, and it must support the patriotic institutions in general. The policy that was conducted by the committee lacks this base. Concerning the settlers and land expropriations, the support was given to the big landowners and not to the farmers and smallholders who were affected by the colonial economic policies. To correct this conduct it was stressed that support should be given to the farmers’ cooperatives to expand them and increase the cultivation of land so as to halt the flow of farmers leaving their land to work in the Israeli labor market.

There is a very large number of intellectuals and professionals who emigrate from the occupied territories every year. The role of the Joint Committee should not be giving support to this person or that, to this imaginary institution or that, but to support the development of the patriotic industries, to develop the role of the patriotic institutions, unions and housing projects supervised by the municipalities. In short, to find new job opportunities to absorb the intellectuals and professionals in the occupied territories and to support their steadfastness.

The same thing should be applied to developing industry and other economic sectors. The unions and institutions must be supported in a balanced way. Their role in the struggle against the occupation must be the yardstick against which the support is measured. This is the direction that the PNC stressed after a lengthy and detailed discussion. The problem is that the Jordanian policy contradicts with our plan, but this should not push the Palestinian partner to the point where it does not fulfill its duties in this field.

Concerning the Joint Committee, since the Baghdad Summit we have been demanding that the Arab decision, recognizing the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, be put into practice, i.e. that the PLO should be the only party responsible for the money.
The Jordanian role should be limited to providing facilities; it should not be playing an equal, and sometimes even more advanced, role than the PLO. This is the basis that we still recognize. In the last PNC it was reaffirmed that the Palestinian side has to be reformed; the decision is still waiting to be implemented.

The problem with the political dialogue still exists. The Jordanian position towards the Camp David accords, which gave the regime nothing, is still not to get involved. This, however, is only one side of the question. The other is that in order to transform its position to a positive policy, the Jordanian regime has to give all forms of support to the PLO. It is the duty of the PLO to keep reevaluating the results of the dialogue. It is the PLO's duty to combine the dialogue with the struggle against the Jordanian position regarding the PLO and the rights of the Palestinian people, especially in the occupied land. It is regrettable that the role of the PLO in the course of the dialogue was one-sided.

The problem that we face inside Jordan is that large numbers of PLO militants, PNC members and elements of other patriotic forces do not play their role in the Joint Committee, or even give their point of view on the political dialogue, how to conduct it or how to confront the regime's maneuvers regarding the rights and demands of the PLO. This problem concerns large sectors of our people, especially in Jordan. Ignoring this matter leads our people to look negatively on the relationship. I repeat that we do not have any illusions about the long-term political goals of the Jordanian regime, but this awareness does not mean that we should not play a tactical political role to confront these intentions and to prevent their achievement in the long run.

Majed Abu Sharrar, member of the Central Committee of Fateh

I will talk about the Joint Committee, as I did not speak of it earlier. The basic aim of this committee is to support the steadfastness of our people in the occupied territories. It is not the best channel to give this support, but it is the one that is available now. I would like to say that from the first the Jordanian regime tried to escape fulfilling its duties to the municipalities, the employees, the societies and the institutions by considering the budget of the committee as a substitute for the money that used to be allocated in the Jordanian budget.

There is no doubt that the regime reactivated the occupied land ministry so as to become more influential than ever. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the fact that the committee has helped our masses by supporting the municipalities, the housing and water projects and industry. One such project is the citrus fruit factory in Gaza. Recently the Joint Committee took a decision to pay monthly salaries to the employees who take one salary in the West Bank. This is in addition to measures aimed at strengthening the steadfastness of the graduates. These things should not be ignored. From their side the enemy is not ignoring them, and has recently banned all housing projects, especially in the Jerusalem area. When we talk about these projects and our benefits, we must note that the Jordanian regime's benefits are greater than ours, but in the end we are achieving a patriotic aim which is supporting the steadfastness of our people in the occupied land.

We must develop the work of the Joint Committee. We must put conditions that guarantee its work, and reform the Palestinian delegation according to the proposals of the PNC. We must also try to minimize the benefits to the Jordanian regime; we should struggle to eliminate the regime's role, and put it back in the position it was in before the Baghdad Summit, when it had a coordinating role only. Before Baghdad, Jordan had no right to interfere in the decisions for the money allocated to the occupied territories.

A last remark is that the Baghdad Summit allocated $150 million to support the steadfastness of our people in the occupied territories. The Joint Committee asked the Amman Summit to increase that amount to $460 million. The amount has not been increased. There is no doubt that the $150 million is not enough to meet the needs of our people. The Executive Committee is required to exert pressure on the oil-rich countries to increase the support to our people in the occupied territories.
LITERATURE FESTIVAL

On August 4th, Palestinian authors and poets from all over the occupied land convened in Jerusalem for a four-day national literature festival. The event encompassed poetry and short story readings, lectures and discussions. A book fair and art exhibition were held in conjunction with the festival. Among the many well-known participants were the poet Samih al Qassem and Emile Habibi, novelist and editor of Al Itihad, the organ of Rakah.

Ali al Khalili, head of the Authors Association of the Arab Thought Forum, which sponsored the festival, delivered the opening address, saying: "This festival, the first of its kind since 1967, expresses fruitful collective work and affirms the significance of literature in confronting the occupation..."

We, the Palestinian writers, meeting in the first Palestinian literature festival in the occupied territories, held in occupied Jerusalem, August 15-18, 1981, declare:

1) We believe that works of literature and art are to serve human freedom and happiness, and that the thinkers, authors and artists are servants of human freedom and happiness.

2) We believe that colonialism, imperialism, racism and genocide are the worst enemies of human freedom and happiness, and that it is the duty of the writers to confront them.

3) We believe that occupying land by force, depriving people of their right to their homeland, opposing the people's right to political and social self-determination and to choose their own representatives, all are positions against humanity. We believe we bear a responsibility to confront such stands.

4) We believe that the unity of our people, and the preservation of the Palestinian identity are two principles that we will never betray.

5) We believe that the military-colonialist occupation of our country is against the will of our people.

6) We believe that the Camp David agreement and autonomy plans are all attempts to liquidate our national rights and to block our right to establish our independent state.

7) We believe that the settlements building, land confiscation, and prohibitions against land cultivation are all attempts to create facts which serve the purpose of liquidating our national rights.

We, Palestinian writers and poets, agree that our duties are:

1) To be committed to our people's problems, and to reflect their sufferings in our writings. Our writings should become instruments which serve the national aims of our people.

2) To fight all isolationist thoughts, ideologies and principles in literature and art, which would stop or delay human progress.

3) To support the Arab national liberation movement and fight against the Arab reactionary regimes and dictatorships which oppress their people and ours.

4) To uncover and resist imperialist attempts to interfere with our problem.

5) To force the evacuation of the imperialist military bases from the area.

6) We denounce the production and use of weapons for the purpose of genocide. We demand that such weapons be outlawed because of their use against the people of the world including our people.

We, the Palestinian writers and poets, in the occupied territories, condemn the Israeli authorities' violations of our rights, such as:

1) Censorship of all intellectual, literary and art works.

2) Restrictions on the freedom of writing and the freedom of speech, the closing of bookshops and the confiscation of books.

3) Restrictions on the activities of the authors and thinkers, such as house arrest orders and other curtailments of their movement.

4) Expulsion of several intellectuals without any legal right.

5) Unjust laws which restrict the progress of the universities.

6) Prohibition of the establishment of social clubs and gatherings and the suppression of existing ones.

7) Harassment of teachers by transferring them to jobs at great distances from their home, and enforcing early retirement.

8) Harassment of students by prohibiting them from outside travel to pursue their education.

9) Prohibition of intellectual gatherings and live theatre.

10) Not issuing permits for new newspapers and magazines.

11) Issuing of unjust laws and military orders.

We, the Palestinian writers, seek:

1) To assist writers in improving their abilities.

2) To publish the works of the writers.

3) To translate the writings of our writers into different languages.

4) To sponsor and help new talent.

5) To seek the publication of new works by the local newspapers.

6) To arrange for public meetings to strengthen the relationship between authors and the community.

7) To reflect the national folklore in new works.

8) To pay special attention to children's literature.

9) To follow recent publications in the Arab world and internationally and to make them available to local writers.

10) To participate in the Arab world and international literary meetings.

11) To encourage the publication of the best of our intellectual works in the progressive Arab and international journals.

12) To encourage the translation of works into Arabic from other languages.
The passage of the Tamir law by the Knesset in the summer of 1980 was a concrete indication of Zionist uneasiness concerning the increasing radicalization of the Palestinians living under occupation since 1948. By making it a criminal act to express sympathy with the PLO or any Palestinian resistance organization, the law targeted what the colonizers fear most: the Palestinian people's united adherence to the revolution and its leadership.

On September 1st of this year, three Palestinians from Shefa'amr were tried under this law in a closed court in Acre. Atef Hamadi and Ibrahim Nahfawi were sentenced to three months imprisonment and Ali Samnih to four; each was fined IS 500. The charge: distributing leaflets referring to the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people". Their trial was significant in being the first time the Tamir law has been applied to Palestinians holding Israeli citizenship. (In the summer, trade unionist Khalil Touma of East Jerusalem was tried under this law.)

However, seen in its overall context, the case of these three is not particularly extraordinary. Those sentenced in Acre are part of a larger group of patriotic activists who have been harassed in recent months, mainly by being placed under house arrest. House arrests are sanctioned by the Israeli terrorist laws which are based on the 1945 Emergency Defense Regulations, originally imposed by the British Mandate authorities. In this context, the application of the new Tamir law is simply a refinement of this "legal" apparatus used against anyone who speaks out for the rights of the Palestinian people.

Atef Hamadi, Ibrahim Nahfawi and Ali Samnih are all activists in the Sons of the Village (Ibna al Balad). Their arrest dates back to efforts to hold a meeting and demonstration in June to mark the occasion of the total occupation of Palestine by the Zionist army in 1967. When the authorities banned the planned activities, the Sons of the Village were forced to instead hold a closed meeting, as this cannot legally be interfered with. However, the Zionists' efforts to suppress patriotic activities in Shefa'amr persisted, and the homes of the three activists were raided in early August, when leaflets were found and used as the pretext for their arrest.

The Arab Student Committee Protests House Arrests

The text of a postcard issued by the Arab Student Committee at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem details the cases of six other Sons of the Village activists; the postcard is directed as a protest to Menachem Begin and reads as follows:

CANCEL THE HOUSE-DETENTION ORDERS

Under the pretext of unspecified 'security' reasons, six Palestinians with Israeli citizenship recently received orders of house-detention for six months. In the case of the first five this is the third consecutive time the order has been renewed.

The house-detention orders, issued by the Israeli Military Governors Moshe Levy and Ben Gal, fall under paragraph 110 of the infamous Defense Emergency Regulations of 1945 (inherited from the British Mandatory regime). The six Palestinians are according to the order, forbidden to leave their home-districts without prior permission from the authorities; forced to stay in their houses from one hour after sunset until sunrise every day, and are obliged to report daily to the nearest police station.

Despite repeated requests from the Palestinians concerned, the Israeli authorities refuse to elaborate on the alleged security risk they represent. The six belong to the leadership of the Sons of the Village Movement and of the Progressive National Movement. These military orders can only be seen as part of the Israeli strategy to silence the legal political opposition these movements represent — thus depriving the Palestinian-Arabs of the right of freedom of speech.

Data: From Um al Fahem, all activists in the Sons of the Village Movement — they received their first order on June 26, 1980; it was renewed on December 26, 1980 and recently on June 26, 1981: Raja Aghbaryie, 29, teacher; Ghassan Aghbaryie, 31, unemployed, ex-prisoner; Hassan Jabarin, 31, bookseller, has no permission to leave the village for book-supplies; Mohammad Abu Salami, 33, electrician and owner of a blacksmith workshop.

From Arrabe, now living in Jerusalem and activist in the Progressive National Movement: Ibrahim Nassar, 30, lawyer — received the order first on June 1, 1979, on January 1, 1980 and recently on July 1, 1981.

Farraj Khneifes, 25, from Shefa'amr, received his first order on July 15, 1981. He is politically active within the framework of the Druze Initiative Committee.

Supplies of this card can be obtained from: The Arab Students Committee (Jerusalem), the Progressive National Movement, 14 Koresh Street, Entrance E/2, Jerusalem.

More House Arrests

On August 10th, General Ben Gal, military commander of the Northern Area, issued a house arrest order for Maysara al Sayyed, a 25 year old worker in Acre. An article in Al Fa'jr, August 30-September 5, 1981, gives an idea of the long harassment to which Maysara has been subjected, as well as of the work of the patriotic forces in Acre. The following is excerpted from this article: Maysara al Sayyed, the seventh Palestinian living inside the pre-1967 borders of the state of Israel currently under house arrest, has been increasingly active in Palestinian affairs in the mixed Arab-Jewish Galilee town since his expulsion from Beer Sheba University in the Naqab last year.

The administration at the southern desert university, described by Maysara as "one of the most racist in the country", organized a purge of activist students in the summer of 1979. After a series of confrontations between rightist students and Palestinians on campus, the administration issued an edict outlawing criticism of the state of Israel or Zionism.

In the ensuing disciplinary cases, 40 students were punished; 12 expelled for one or two years. Maysara al Sayyed was suspended until the academic year 1982-83. He was in the third year of his industrial engineering course. Appeals failed.

After his expulsion Maysara went to work in the Naqab phosphate factory Nakhal Tsir. He was summarily dismissed one day after the boss was informed of his political opinion (support of the PLO).

The central target of the work of Maysara al Sayyed and other progressives in Acre is the Acre Development Company. "They call it a development company," commented Maysara, "but really they're dedicated to expelling the Arabs from this town."

Maysara is particularly scathing about the collaboration of the waqf property admini-
RATION with the company. "The people on the committee are put there by the government and either give away the mosque's property or rent it for 99 years," says Maysara, "You can imagine what will happen in 99 years." The Islamic waqf had title to virtually all rented property in Acre Old City as well as extensive agricultural land around the city. Today it is all in the hands of Zionist companies...

Maysara al Sayyed places his detention very firmly in the context of repressive policies in Palestine and outside. He attributes the Israeli military order to the fact that he is a progressive nationalist articulating an anti-Zionist political line. He believes in full support for Palestinian opposition to the "agreement at Camp David forged by US imperialism, Israel and Sadat's Egypt." He also expressed confidence in the (ability of the) Palestinians behind their leaders to confront the present attacks in Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza and the "village league in its place in the Camp David plots, driven and controlled by the military government... The Palestinian people know these tactics well, and they will stand united against them," concluded Maysara.

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Other restrictions have been imposed. In early September, two residents of Shefa'amr who are active in the Druze Initiative Committee, Said Qa'ed Bei and Suleiman Salameh, were banned from entering the 1967 occupied territories for one year. One can surmise that their restriction is related to the problems experienced by the Zionist authorities in trying to impose Israeli IDs on the Syrian Druze in the Golan Heights. The position of the Druze Initiative Committee, that the Druze in occupied Palestine are part of the Palestinian people, and the committee's efforts to defeat the Zionist policy of singling out the Druze on the grounds of religion, are a concrete support to the Golan Heights population in resisting the Israeli IDs.

In October, there were new reports of house detention orders being issued or extended. In addition to members of the Sons of the Village, those affected included Salah Baransi, a long-time Palestinian progressive nationalist, founder of the now outlawed Al Ard movement, who has previously served 10 years in prison for "security offenses", i.e. defending the rights of the Palestinian people under occupation.

For background information on the organizations mentioned in this article, see Bulletin 49, April 1981: "Palestinian Resistance in the Zionist State."
a tactic whose effectiveness has been proven by the return of the IDs.

In August the Druze community appealed to the Israeli High Court for the release of the leaders. They had been charged with inciting people against the occupation and the identity cards, and the defense lawyers requested that the evidence the authorities had gathered be made public. The appeal was abandoned when Begin personally forbade any access to the files. Hundreds of Golan Heights residents demonstrated in front of the courtroom, chanting “the Golan is Syrian” and slogans in support of the Palestinian people. Afterwards they met with West Bank patriotic leaders and organizations, who expressed their total support to the common struggle of the Syrian Druze against the Zionist occupation.

The struggle of the Syrian Druze has also received support from the Palestinian Druze who live within the Zionist state. The Druze Initiative Committee led a solidarity campaign for the Golan Druze. They issued a petition demanding the release of the 5 prisoners and recognition of the wishes of the Golan population. Within one week the petition had been signed by 1000 Druze men of draft age, an important protest due to the Zionist policy of drafting Druze youth into the army. One leader of the Druze Initiative Committee, Farraj Khneifes, was placed under town arrest for 6 months in July. He stated: “My activity in support of the Golan Druze is probably why I was placed under arrest.” For Farraj Khneifes and for many other Palestinian and Syrian Druze activists, arrest had become a common experience.

Farraj himself had previously spent 3 years in hiding and 3 years in prison because of his refusal to serve in the Zionist army.

On September 1st the administrative detention of the 5 leaders was extended another 3 months. Administrative detention is a legacy of the British Mandate Emergency Laws; it states that anyone can be arrested and held indefinitely, with no charges being filed and no trial. However, under pressure from the mass movement, the authorities released the two oldest leaders in late September, and placed them under house arrest instead.

The struggle against Zionist education policies

One area where the similarity in Israeli policy against the Druze population of both Syria and Palestine is clear is in education. The Israelis have always tried to separate the Druze from the Arabs, using the classic colonial technique of ‘divide and rule’. Thus they have tried to educate the Druze separately, and have even created a new school subject called Druze heritage, which teaches that the Druze are a separate nationality, not simply a religion.

The Zionists have also systematically held back the development of education in the Golan. There are only 8 elementary schools for a student population of 4000, and until 1980 it was forbidden for Golan residents to attend universities in Syria. Hebrew is taught in the schools, an elementary school in Masa‘ada was closed after students demonstrated against this. All of these policies have been increasingly opposed by patriotic teachers and school heads. The Israeli response to this opposition has been to force the teachers to join the Federation of Israeli Teachers, fire and transfer many patriotic teachers and appoint those Golan residents who accepted Israeli identity cards in their stead. Golan residents say that one teacher so appointed has not even finished a 5th grade education. These pro-Israeli teachers have painted the Zionist flag on the schools, and expelled students who refused to participate in the Israeli Independence Day celebrations.

These measures have only increased resistance. At the end of the last school year, Golan teachers, students and parents issued the following demands to the occupation authorities:

- reinstatement of all teachers fired for political reasons
- no Israeli ID holders as teachers
- stop courses on Druze heritage, as it is an Israeli invention
- remove any teachers who didn’t complete 5th grade
- remove all Israeli soldiers as teachers
- free political prisoners

At the same time the Golan teachers announced the formation of their own union. On September 1st, to demonstrate the seriousness of their demands, teachers and students went out on strike for 8 days, and they have stated that they are prepared to do so again. The effectiveness of this organized mass action was seen in October when the occupation authorities announced that 30 Golan teachers would be reinstated as a “conciliatory gesture.”
This poem was written by a woman in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights.

This is a picture of what happened when they took my husband to prison for administrative detention. We are faithful to him and therefore we pledge to continue on the path he drew for us.

The time: midnight
The date: the end of May, beginning of June
We were asleep, enjoying pleasant dreams about freedom
Suddenly we were awoken
A gang of occupying soldiers were knocking at the door.
Who?
Open up!
We opened the door
They came in, pointing their guns,
a fierce look in their eyes.
We said, you?!
Enemies of humanity — you?!
You, the sons of Zionism,
In the name of God, what do you want from us?
You, son of the cursed Balfour.
Put on your clothes!
They barked to the owner of the house,
This is a warrant for your arrest.
Listen.
They read it.
Sign your name here.
Put your clothes on.
He went to the toilet,
They followed him, watched him,
as if he was going to get a bomb.
Our looks were like bombs
Our feelings were like bullets
Our morale was high.
Soon they took him away
after they had searched everywhere,
hoping to find something to prove
that we hate the occupation.
Something to prove that we know
that they are stepping on our rights.
They can imprison him, but
they cannot imprison the feelings of his wife and son.
We are upset about his arrest,
but we respect his determination and his pride.
What is your position concerning the issues that may be discussed at the upcoming Arab Summit, particularly the Fahd plan?

There are two main points on the agenda of the Arab Summit: the plan of Fahd and the situation in Lebanon. Regarding the Fahd plan, we think that the struggle to defeat this plan has been transformed into a major battle in the conflict between the Arab liberation forces and on the other hand, imperialism, Zionism and reaction. It is impossible to understand the Fahd plan without reference to the execution of Sadat by the Egyptian army. It is obvious that this plan has a series of aims, none of which are truly related to enforcing the recognition or implementation of the main rights of the Palestinian people. First of all, the Fahd plan is designed to emphasize that the Arabs are now ready to recognize the state of Israel, and this is no minor issue for the Arab and Palestinian people. At the very least, the Fahd plan aims at creating two sets of divisions: divisions within the PLO and the various Palestinian organizations, and divisions between the forces of Arab liberation, and in particular between Syria and the Palestinians. Lastly, though the Saudis may not necessarily expect this plan to be recognized at the coming Arab Summit, they want it to be represented as the main if not the sole Arab initiative regarding the Palestinian question.

We should begin by stressing a point of principle: In the struggle against Israel and imperialism, it is not the business of the Arabs to make initiatives about peace in the Middle East; it is the business of the Arabs to fight and to support the Palestinian Resistance. It is up to those who are promoting the peaceful settlement to propose initiatives and plans, and for the Arabs to state their position.

Secondly, it is fully justified to name this initiative Camp David II at a time when the whole fate of Camp David is being called into question — after the death of Sadat, after the return of Begin to power, after the problems related to even implementing the third phase of Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. This is how one must view the Fahd plan; we cannot deal with it by quibbling about the different words in the eight points, for the simple reason that it is not accidental that the PLO is omitted from the eight points, and that there is no explicit reference to the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. It is obvious that the plan aims at being implemented by the USA. None of the additions made verbally by Fahd himself or by the Saudi Foreign Minister have induced modifications in the plan itself. If these were included, there would be no Fahd plan. Rather there would be a return to the resolutions of the various Arab Summits.

As our General Secretary Mohsen Ibrahim has repeatedly stated, we in the CAO think that this plan should not be allowed onto the agenda of the upcoming summit in Fez. The main forces concerned, especially the PLO and Syria, supported by the Arab national liberation movement in general and by the other members of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, should block this plan from the agenda.

The Fahd plan is a long range one; the Saudis are willing to buy time in order to give it some form of Arab legitimacy even as being one of the plans to be discussed by Arab summits, not necessarily this summit; the Saudis may wait for a time when the relations of forces are being modified more and more in favor of imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

We reject this plan not only because the Saudi regime is reactionary but also based on past experience. The Fahd plan is in fact less radical than Sadat's famous speech in Jerusalem before the Knesset. One does not need to go far back in history; we have the past few years' experience to show that there is a difference between the wording of a plan and its intentions, and between a plan and what is eventually implemented. At least we must retain this from the experience of Sadat.

In taking our position, we also attach great importance to the fact that the Saudis are eager to separate the Arabs, and the Palestinians in particular, from the main world power that supports them, namely the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. The Saudis are keen to rearrange the so-called Arab-Israeli conflict as a conflict contained.
manipulated and resolved by the US alone.

Fahd plan for Lebanon

We Lebanese feel concerned in more than one way. Our concern is not only because we have been fighting for the rights of the Palestinian people; it is also because there is another Fahd plan which is related to Lebanon. We believe that these two plans are intimately interrelated. The Fahd plan which the Saudi representative in the Arab Follow-up Committee has been trying to propose is the Lebanese equivalent to Fahd’s Palestinian plan. It is mainly directed against Syria, calling for the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon during the next six months. It aims at containing and limiting the activities of the Palestinian Resistance. It tries to impose the Lebanese Army, which has become fascist-dominated, on the whole of Lebanon. Finally, it is a plan for rebuilding the Lebanese society on the basis of the confessional system which the Lebanese people have fought so long to rid themselves of. So in this struggle, we are concerned both as Arabs and as Lebanese.

How do you evaluate the outcome of the Arab Follow-up Committee meeting which was held this past weekend?

The main role of this committee is to implement the tasks for which it was reactivated, namely to resolve the question of collaboration between the Phalangist Party and Israel. From the beginning, the Saudi representative in this committee has tried to present the verbal message from Beshir Gemayel and the Lebanese Front about ending collaboration with Israel as a sufficient resolution of the problem. The aim of this is to change the committee’s function to one that is antagonistic to Syria, the PLO and the Lebanese Patriotic Movement. This has also been the position of President Sarkis. In fact, this is the means by which Beshir Gemayel was invited to the US, through Saudi mediation.

The struggles waged by the Lebanese Patriotic Movement during the past months have foiled precisely this attempt to divert the function of the Arab Follow-up Committee. We escalated our political campaign especially because Prime Minister Wazzan agreed to what is called the “Lebanese working paper” which was supposed to be implemented after Beshir Gemayel sent his secret letter about collaboration with Israel to Sarkis. This working paper has been rejected by the majority of Lebanese like many such initiatives before it, because it indirectly fulfills the Lebanese Front’s main demands against Syria and the Palestinian presence and activity in Lebanon, and for the reconstruction of the old social and political system.

However, in the recent meeting of the Arab Follow-up Committee this working paper was, if not totally withdrawn, at least set aside. It was reconfirmed that the issue of the army is one upon which the Lebanese differ, and that it is intimately related to the political solution. Perhaps most important, the function of the committee was reestablished as being to set up a committee to control the movement of arms from Israel to the Lebanese Front and their relations as such. We believe that this constitutes a substantial gain for all anti-fascist forces in this country; the proof of this is the extent to which the Lebanese Front was infuriated by it. Attempts will be made to block implementation of this observer force that should make sure that the Phalangist Party has severed its relations with Israel; thus, the struggle concerning the function of the Arab Follow-up Committee will continue.

The Lebanese Patriotic Movement launched a political offensive against the government in September. You mentioned that this had effects on the Arab Follow-up Committee. Can you touch on other aspects of the LPM’s efforts in the fields of relations between the various patriotic forces, security in the popular areas and the social and economic problems faced by the masses?

Lebanon is entering a critical phase, because by next summer a new President of the Republic is to be elected. We believe that the coming months will witness bitter struggles, not excluding military confrontations. Usually when the Lebanese Front is in the corner, the Israelis intervene with a major military strike. Thus, it is with good reason that people are expecting such an attack. Also, the Phalangist Party itself might resort to reactivating some of the military fronts. We believe that this phase will be characterized by intense US-Israeli-Saudi pressure in accordance with their well-known division of labor: the Israelis being the ‘tough guys’ intervening through the force of arms and the Saudis working for similar ends through diplomatic and political means.

For this reason, what we in the Lebanese Patriotic Movement call our counter-offensive, is based on many fronts.

First: Building the largest anti-fascist alliance....

For the first time, this has become a practical and not purely a theoretical question, due to two major events of the past month. For one, the alliance with former President Franjieh and former Prime Minister Karami has become a fact by virtue of the common positions taken by both these leaders and the Lebanese Patriotic Movement. This is not officially proclaimed in documents, but the important thing is that the political positions have been unified; this was clearly demonstrated in the campaign against the present government.

Second and equally important is that there is now a formal and regular means of coordination between the Lebanese Patriotic Movement and the other forces which are present in the patriotic areas but not represented in the Central Political Council of the LPM. This is the Higher Coordination Committee, which is led by the LPM and united by general acceptance of the LPM’s main platform and present policies.

So in fact, this broad alliance now exists, and this is an important achievement in building unity among all the anti-fascist forces. Of course, there will always remain certain figures, such as Saeb Salam, who consider themselves as Moslem counterparts to the Phalangist Party. By virtue of their positions, they have no place inside this alliance.

Is it deliberate that you term this an alliance and not a front?

Alliance is the better term, because a front is usually a coalition of parties; Franjieh and Karami are not heads of parties, but traditional leaders who in their own way have become victims of fascism. An alliance is the most appropriate form for coordinating activities between homogeneous forces.

Does this alliance also entail improvement of the relations with the Amal movement and a stop to the recurring clashes between Amal and the communist forces in the Lebanese Patriotic Movement, including your party?

The relations with Amal have improved largely through political cooperation and by virtue of defending ourselves militarily. Many a party has discovered that no one can monopolize political activity in the popular areas; no one can succeed in building confessional armed mini-states on the model of the one built by Beshir Gemayel. This has been an important lesson that has led many forces
to a more democratic approach to the reality of the anti-fascist areas and forces.

We and Amal are presently engaged in putting an end to the series of armed confrontations. There is a high level of political coordination and a convergence of positions on main issues. We as communists are ready to coexist with Amal in the areas where they exist. We believe that we also represent the dispossessed. (Note: Amal's full name means Movement of the Dispossessed.)

We existed before Amal and believe that we do not have a comprehensive policy and approach to the reality of the mass areas, and between us and the masses exist. President Sarkis, on the other hand, has a coherent policy, whereby what is called reconstruction is considered as the domain not only of the private sector, but of the bank sector with its foreign capital. In accordance with his policy, the minimal services provided by the Lebanese state to its citizens have been withdrawn and returned to the private sector; this applies to health services and the building sector, etc. Previously, prices on basic necessities, from bread to fuel oil, were controlled through a system of government subsidies; these have been withdrawn, thus raising prices. Coming on top of all the tragedies of the war, this policy has aggravated the basic problems of all the Lebanese, regardless of their political affiliation. The situation is even more aggravated in the areas controlled by Beshir Gemayel where prices and rents are higher.

While we have been fighting on the political and national fronts in general, Sarkis has managed to impose a whole set of economic and social measures. The LPM has been the legitimate representative of our people's patriotic and national aspirations over the years, but the logical position of the communists and other parties of the LPM is also to be the real representative of the social interests of the workers, peasants, intellectuals, wage earners and large sectors of the petit and middle bourgeoisie, who are also suffering from this system and its aggravation due to the war and Sarkis' policies. We give great importance to reacting and uniting this entire struggle. We can impose measures on the government; we can paralyze plans and decisions which we refuse; there are cabinet members who consider themselves allied to the wide anti-fascist alliance.

The CAO has given serious attention to reactivating different forms of committees and struggle on the community and place of work level. In the post-war period, there has been a total collapse of community services and an accumulation of issues that must be fought for and resolved. There is also trade union work. The trade union movement in this country is still unified. Perhaps even more than before, there is a struggle going on here between two different platforms for the working class -- the fascists' and that of the left. The trade union movement has a role to play, but so do the political forces, in influencing and orienting economic, social and cultural policies in the country.

Fourth: Security

The security situation is a serious gap in the non-fascist areas. I would like to point out the logic we are trying to impose: We are trying to prove that the plurality of political forces, the presence of the PLO and the Syrian army does not necessarily equal chaos. We are trying to show that this can be resolved without resorting to blood-baths like those of Beshir Gemayel. The process is painful and slow, but it can be achieved voluntarily and democratically.

Closing the gaps in the patriotic areas is very urgent. There is a ferocious struggle going on, which the fascists have pushed to criminal proportions with all forms of destabilization, including the car bombs. Enf orcing security is one way of rectifying our relations with the masses. We have openly called for mass control over the leaders. We take this very seriously. The sacrifices of the Lebanese and Palestinian people are big enough without their being subject to violations on the part of the organizations. There is no use for arms without a legitimate militant function; these always stray into the hands of our enemies.

People have responded favorably to the security measures which are being implemented in phases, week by week. The coming phase will deal with the more serious infringements, the use of arms for extortion, etc.

We believe that both the state and the fascists are consciously building social tension in this area, aggravating its problems. But those who might like to compare our area with the one controlled by Beshir Gemayel should remember that he has 'cleaned' his area of the poor, Moslems and Christians alike, and of the Palestinians. The state continues this policy by consciously discriminating between different areas, by withdrawing services from the South, by aggravating the housing problem and the problems of displaced persons.

Thus, security is not a technical question alone; it is a social question. It is a big challenge to the LPM, the PLO and the Syrians. A lot of determination has been put into this matter; it is ultimately a political struggle to show that our version of Lebanon can work. The system of Beshir Gemayel is based on killing off opponents and one-party rule. Even if this appears to be working in 10-15% of Lebanon, which is not only exclusively Christian but almost exclusively Maronite, this would never work in all of Lebanon. Though the Phalangists want to dominate all of Lebanon, their policies are unacceptable to the vast majority of the people. This is the inherent contradiction in Beshir Gemayel's own plan.
LEBANESE COMMUNIST PARTY

This October the Lebanese Communist Party celebrated its 57th anniversary. On this occasion, the PFLP's Arabic weekly Al Hadaf interviewed Comrade George Batal, member of the LCP Politbureau, about the foundation and development of the party. The interview was noteworthy due to Comrade Batal's candor in dealing with past mistakes made by the party and the process whereby these have been corrected. Following is a synopsis of his account which we feel will contribute to our readers' understanding of the LCP's course of development, whereby today it stands among the vanguard forces, militantly confronting the plans of the enemy alliance in Lebanon and regionally.

The LCP emerged as a result of the struggles of the Arab national liberation forces. The decade of the twenties was characterized by the break-up of the Ottoman Empire and the partition of the area in accordance with the plans of the colonial powers, Britain and France, as finalized in the Sykes-Picot agreement (1916) and the Balfour Declaration (1917). In this situation, it was natural that the progressive forces in the patriotic movement searched for new and better means of confronting the colonial occupation and domination of their homeland.

At this time, socialist ideas and theory were just beginning to make headway among more advanced patriotic circles, especially after the October Revolution in Russia. This socialist revolution escalated the crystallization of awareness among the vanguard of the working class and led to the foundation of labor unions.

Under these conditions, a number of working revolutionary intellectuals decided it was necessary to found a revolutionary party able to advance the patriotic, social and revolutionary struggle. At a meeting in Hadath, in the southern area of Beirut, on October 24th, 1924, these comrades decided to form the party. The founders were Lebanese, yet they decided to name the party the Syrian Communist Party as an expression of their rejection of the French Mandate's separation of Lebanon from Syria. This was in solidarity with the overall patriotic position against the Mandate.

Initially the main task was struggling against the Mandate for the independence of Syria and Lebanon and the creation of a united nation. The party emphasized its program in practice in 1925, when comrades took part in the Syrian rebellion. The party issued a communique calling on the French soldiers to turn their guns against their generals and join their class brothers in Syria and Lebanon. In response, the French Mandate authorities unleashed an extensive campaign of repression, imprisoning, torturing and assassinating party leaders and cadres.

However, the party maintained its general line with the main slogan of struggling against the Mandate, and taking part in all patriotic battles involving the Syrian and Lebanese people, throughout the thirties and until Lebanon's independence in the forties. In this, the party resisted a left extremist tendency which proposed the formation of a workers and peasants government in order to overthrow the Mandate. Thus, prior to independence, the idea of a political party was introduced, and the first unions were founded by politicizing the workers in order that they struggle for their rights. The first general workers union was established along with the first labor laws in the Arab world. Mustafa al Ariss, member of the party Politbureau, headed this union. The party also played a major role in spreading socialist ideas among the masses and at the same time did not neglect the national issues facing the Arab people. From the start, the party pointed out the danger of the Balfour Declaration and the Zionist colonization of Palestine. It played an important role in condemning Zionism and supporting Arab unity, not only in Lebanon, but also in the international communist movement. In 1934, the party organized a conference in Zahle, attended by a large number of Syrians and Lebanese who declared that the Arabs are one nation which stretches from the Mediterranean to the Gulf.

With the rise of fascism in Europe, the party was quick to expose this danger as an advanced form of imperialist and racial domination. It posed the struggle against fascism as a major element in realizing national liberation in the Arab world. It worked to form the League for the Confrontation of Fascism, including many well-known patriotic intellectuals. In this period, the party successfully combined patriotic struggle with the struggle for the rights of the working class. The party was prominent in the patriotic conference that led the battle for independence. Party leader, Farajullah Helou, was secretary of this conference.

Comrade Batal notes that when Lebanon gained independence, it was natural that the state be led by representatives of the bourgeoisie, as this class played an important role in the struggle for independence. The party, on the other hand, had been established under difficult conditions and was constantly exposed to double oppression, from the Mandate and from the bourgeoisie. In addition, the working class was still in the developing phases. It can be said that the party did not achieve the tasks it had set, yet to judge the party's action, Comrade Batal points out that one must consider the events and conditions of the times, and the balance of forces internationally and in the region.

With the elimination of the Mandate and the end of the second world war, the country entered a period of class conflict characterized by the bourgeoisie's efforts to destroy the patriotic alliance that had been established in the struggle for independence. The ruling class escalated its antagonism to the working class and its party. This occurred in the context of an international situation where colonialism was being supplanted by neo-colonialism; imperialism worked to undermine genuine independence for newly liberated colonies by forging an alliance with
the local bourgeoisie. After the victory over fascism and the establishment of the socialist bloc, imperialism evoked the cold war and established military alliances under the slogan of fighting the “communist threat”. All this left its mark on the political development in Lebanon and the Arab world in this period, which witnessed the escalation of battles in and around Palestine between imperialism and Zionism on the one hand and the patriotic forces on the other.

The party, while facing the oppression of the ruling class and the new attacks of imperialism, made a dangerous mistake. In a sudden transformation, the leaders reversed the party line which had consistently rejected any Zionist presence in Palestine. They departed from rejection of any form of partition and concurred with the UN Partition Plan to create a Zionist and an Arab state in Palestine.

This reversal caused chaos in the party ranks. The ruling class took advantage of this to divert the attention of the people from its own treason; it directed blows against the popular movement and the party, which was banned, with many cadres being imprisoned. Instead of trying to correct their mistake, the party leaders began following an extreme left, adventurist line which widened the gap between the party and the people and weakened the party’s role. Then in the fifties, the party embarked on a clear line opposing Zionism and struggling against Israel, imperialism and the reactionary regimes. Yet the party failed to criticize itself for the wrong position it took in 1948. Thus, despite fighting major social and political battles, the party was unable to evaluate its line on the national cause; this led to a delay in realizing the progressive role of the national movements opposing imperialism, as represented by the policies of Abdel Nasser.

The sixties was a period of intense internal conflict between the revolutionary and the opportunist trends in the party. The correction did not really come until after the party split from the Syrian Communist Party in 1964. From 1964-67, leading opportunist cadres were expelled from the party ranks. In 1968, the party’s second congress officially rectified the line and the party could again be recognized as a real communist party, combining patriotic and social struggle. The 20 year period had weakened not only the party but also the struggle of the masses and the working class, and delayed the revolutionary process. Thus, the second congress played a truly historical role in the life of the party and the patriotic movement.

From this point, the party regained its position as a vanguard of all forms of struggle for a united democratic Arab Lebanon. The party has since remained consistent in its defense of the historical rights of the Palestinian people to their homeland; it has worked for the unity of the organizations of the Arab national liberation movement and the development of a common struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction, and for Arab unity on the basis of national and social liberation and democracy. The present struggle of the party, as charted by the second, third and fourth congresses, corresponds to the demands of the period in Lebanon and the region.

The alliance policy pursued by the LCP has had important effects within the LPM, enabling a unique and advanced class alliance between the political representatives of various social sectors. In the view of the party, its own strength grows in proportion to the strength of the LPM. The revolutionary line adopted by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th congresses has enabled the party to forge militant relations with other anti-imperialist forces, and to play an important role within the communist and revolutionary movement in the world.

Al Hadaf also asked Comrade Batal how the LCP evaluates the transformation of petit bourgeois nationalist organizations to Marxist-Leninist ones:

"We hold in high esteem the phenomenon of new Arab forces transforming from a nationalist origin to a proletarian position by the adoption of Marxism-Leninism. We are anxious to strengthen our relations and take an active role with these forces… in order to shorten the difficult road of struggle for socialism, which is our common aim. In practice we have advanced relations with these forces, such as the Communist Action Organization, the PFLP and the DFLP… However, in the end we call for unity of the Marxist-Leninist forces in Lebanon and on the Palestinian level... We also aspire to strengthen the unity of all Arab national liberation movements in the battle against Zionism, Imperialism and Arab reaction."

ANNIVERSARY SPEECH

Representatives of the organizations of the Lebanese Patriotic Movement and the Palestinian Resistance, as well as other well-known progressive figures, gathered to celebrate the anniversary of the Lebanese Communist Party. At the celebration in Beirut, Comrade George Hawi, General Secretary of the Party, delivered the main speech. When speaking about the current situation in relation to the plans of the enemy, as crystallized in Camp David, Comrade Hawi spoke as follows:

"I assure you that our party will always strive for patriotic unity on the Lebanese level and especially to strengthen the alliance between the Lebanese Patriotic Movement, the Palestinian Revolution, Syria, Libya and all the countries of the steadfastness and Confrontation Front and all the Arab national liberation forces. We will strive for Arab unity based on antagonism towards imperialism and Zionism and will fight all suspicious settlements. These words have assumed special importance after the execution of the traitor Sadat… and in the face of all the dangerous plans hatched as substitutes for Camp David. These do not differ from Camp David in substance, but only in form. They all have the same aim: surrendering all the cards to the US and Israel, dividing Arab solidarity and strengthening imperialist and Zionist domination over our land...

"We realize the danger building up around us, especially the dangers of initiatives coming from some Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. We ask that the Arab countries be committed to the decisions of the Arab Summits, especially the Baghdad Summit, which rejected any unilateral capitulationist initiatives. We ask the Arab countries to reject these plans, and we urge the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front to be the Arab vanguard, imposing a minimum level of patriotism, which no one is allowed to violate without being considered a traitor…"

Comrade Hawi reaffirmed the LCP’s commitment to the three aims of the LPM: to confront Israel and the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon and Saad Haddad’s border strip; to struggle to stop the extension of the Zionist-fascist plans and to prevent the regime from dividing the country and subsequently reuniting it on the basis of subordination to the Zionist entity; to prevent those plans similar to those of the isolationists in which the regime plays a dangerous part… by building the army on a sectarian basis, an army which does not defend security in the country nor defend its unity and borders..."
The Lebanese Association for Popular Action-Amel was established in September 1979. The addition of the Arabic word amel to the name is significant; amel means worker, and is also the name of a mountain in the South. Thus, in the words of the Association’s director, Dr. Kamal Mohanna, amel signifies both the importance of the worker and the steadfastness of the South.

The purpose of the Association as laid down in its statutes is the development of the Lebanese communities in the South and in the popular neighborhoods in the cities, inhabited by the least advantaged strata of the population. The authorities’ historical neglect of the South has been thrown into sharper focus since the civil war, the Israeli invasion of 1978 and the continuous aggression since. This neglect extends to the popular areas. Thus it becomes the duty of the government against the popular committees. Not only do these campaigns serve the health needs of the people, but they also put pressure on the authorities to fulfill their obligations to these communities. For example, after one Association-sponsored campaign was planned in the Bekaa, the government announced its own campaign. However, the deteriorating security situation impedes the work; a vaccination campaign begun in Toulin, near the occupied border strip, was forced to halt when the building being used was dynamited by the fascist militia of Saad Haddad.

The Association has also sponsored public health centers and clinics throughout the South and Beirut. In addition to routine care of the sick, these centers provide vaccines, first aid courses, blood banks, preparations for shelters and organize local cleanliness campaigns. The centers are set up with the local popular committee, and full community participation is encouraged from the beginning. Indeed, the clinic could not exist without the support and interest of the community. The Association goes to the community to find a building, furniture and supplies. They believe that a clinic can only serve the particular needs of an area if it is truly based in the neighborhood, if the people feel it is their clinic. This approach inspires people as to the power of their own potentials. A good example of this is a clinic that has recently been opened in Mousseitbeh, a neighborhood located near the line dividing East and West Beirut in the old hotel district. The clinic was planned with the popular committee and other local groups, and has proved such a success that the neighborhood people now want the Association’s help in beginning a laboratory and a social/cultural club.

The health needs of the Lebanese masses cannot be met solely through clinics. The following excerpt from a recent Association report gives an idea of the variety of tasks related to health, and so needed in war-torn Lebanon:

Southern family around the ruins of their destroyed house.
As a consequence of the situation that has existed in Lebanon since April, diverse activities have been realized in the framework of an emergency program.

a) The formation of a group of 6 technicians for the different medical centers to make analyses and to collect blood. In the popular quarters we have organized a classification of blood groups with a number of voluntary blood donors. We take their address and blood group; when needed, we summon the blood donors and blood is given to persons of the same neighborhood. In Shiyah, 100 persons participated in this campaign, in Bourj al Barajneh 96 and in Hay es-Sullum 88 persons.

b) Preparation of 40 first aid kits and 40 stretchers which have been distributed to the different centers.

c) A campaign has been organized to track down epidemics in the schools in the villages of the South, in order to avoid the spread of contagious diseases caused by lice and scabies.

d) A campaign to register handicapped people in the area of Tyre (Sour) and Zahrani.

e) Because of the urgency of the situation the Association has made a stock of medicines and of essential food products (rice, sugar, flour...)

f) Committees have been formed to visit the wounded in the hospitals; to give small presents and to stay permanently with the seriously wounded.

On the occasion of their second anniversary, the Association announced a new major project — to build a 50 bed hospital in Sour, an area desperately in need of additional health facilities. The board is now engaged in trying to raise the 10 million Lebanese pounds needed to complete the hospital by 1983.

Vocational Training

There is a pressing need for vocational training among the Lebanese masses. The people who were displaced from the South to the slums of Beirut were mainly agricultural workers, with no skills that can find them employment in the city. However, the programs needed to bring skills to all these people are too demanding for any one organization. The Association has focused its efforts on training for women, particularly those who are now heads of families because their husbands have been killed. Many of these women must provide for large families, but they have never been employed outside their homes. The Association has set up programs in typing, sewing and cutting material. However, the escalation of Zionist-fascist aggression since April has greatly impeded this work: in Sfeir, Bourj al Barajneh and Hay es-Sullum (all southern suburbs of Beirut), programs that were set up for typing or sewing have now been transformed into emergency first aid centers.

Education

Among the essential services that the Lebanese government does not adequately provide to the patriotic areas is education. This neglect is seen in the high illiteracy rate and in the lack of schools, especially nurseries and kindergartens. The Association is working on a literacy campaign, using materials provided by the state and by the FLO. In addition, they are sponsoring development units, one of which is now open in Baalbek. These units address all the pressing social needs, grouping together a nursery, kindergarten, mother-child care center, clinic and vocational training.

In addition to its work in these areas, the Association also stresses the importance of preserving the national Lebanese culture, such as handicrafts from the South.

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**EMERGENCY CIVIL DEFENSE**

The popular areas in Lebanon have long been the major military target of Zionist-fascist aggression. For this reason, emergency civil defense measures are of concern to all patriotic and progressive Lebanese and Palestinian forces. The Bulletin staff spoke with Dr. Kamal Mohanna about his assessment of this work and the Association's role in it, especially the October 1st car bomb.

The Association coordinates with other social and medical organizations involved in civil defense. Ten minutes after the Arab University car bomb exploded, we were able to move 20 defense workers with stretchers, first aid kits and ambulances into the area. They coordinated with other groups to evacuate the wounded and martyred, and remove gas canisters from the buildings. Everyone was very satisfied with the spirit of sacrifice and bravery of the civil defense workers, who were facing death. This was true not only of the civil defense workers, but also of the fighters who participated in the evacuation.

We know that these explosions and hostile operations will continue. Their aim is to create chaos in the popular areas. The Zionists, fascists and the Deuxieme Bureau want to impose security solutions on these areas in favor of the fascist project — a project that is connected to the Zionist plan for the area.

Through our experience with emergency work we are able to deduce lessons. We need a rapid deployment force, like the Americans, but on a smaller scale, and for defense. We are working to create completely equipped units of 25 people, and are in touch with international organizations to provide us with supplies. We are training people not only in Beirut, but in all areas where we expect Israeli attacks or explosions. This work is so important because in minutes we might be able to save the lives of many people.

It's not enough that there are many civil defense workers; they have courage, but they also need commitment to the patriotic line to be willing to sacrifice, be they Lebanese or Palestinian, as the work might cost them their life. We also need coordination. We call on all the different organizations to cooperate, to equip the workers with all their needs, to move in an organized way — whether it be to evacuate the wounded or organize a blood campaign. One problem that arose after the October 1st explosion was that we got more blood than we needed, and not the types we needed. There was an emotional reaction from the masses to give, to donate blood, but we — as responsibilities — should tell our masses what we need and what we don't need.

To promote cooperation, a conference has been held for popular organizations. Joint committees were formed, but our coordination still does not meet the heavy responsibilities we have to carry. However, we consider that coordination does exist, and that we are part of it and work within its framework. In the next explosion — as we have no illusions about the enemy plans for the Palestinian Resistance and the LPM — our reaction will be more organized and more capable of facing such attacks. The most important point is the spirit and patriotic commitment of the people.
Building from the masses

The Association raises funds mainly by collecting dues from members and donations from patriotic organizations and international institutions, such as OXFAM, though they hope one day to become self-sufficient through their vocational centers. However, the ultimate success of their projects is not based on funds raised, but on their ability to mobilize the neighborhoods concerned and to work with other organizations. The process of establishing a clinic is a good example of the Association's view of mass work. It is never difficult to choose a location, as virtually all of the Lebanese popular areas lack health services. However, beginning the work with a clear understanding of the particular needs and composition of a community is essential. Thus the Association initially conducts a demographic survey to obtain objective information. Together with this is meeting and talking with the people to develop relations, and find out how they perceive their own needs. The Association relies on its close relations with the LPM and the various organizational and geographical backgrounds of the board members.

The staff of a clinic is mainly volunteer, or the Association covers the cadre's monthly needs. The nurse, who is present all day, usually comes from the neighborhood. A doctor comes a certain number of hours each day; his time is volunteered, as he maintains a private practice for financial support.

When a clinic is being opened, the Association collects donations from the neighborhood to buy supplies. Furnishings are also donated. All local forces are encouraged to participate. Each clinic is independent, formed on the basis of local needs and abilities. The Association believes that encouraging initiative among the people is the main guarantee of the continuation and success of any project, and the duty of all patriotic organizations that are confronting the willful neglect by the state in addition to the ravages of Zionist-fascist aggression.

THE AWACS PACKAGE

Following lengthy debate, the air defense enhancement package — better known as the AWACS deal — was approved by the US Senate, enabling the sale of this advanced equipment to Saudi Arabia. The debate over the package and its approval show that the US still abides by the old maxims that have shaped imperialism's policy towards the Middle East in the past. In this article, we will deal with the various aspects of the AWACS deal in the context of the situation in the Middle East.

The main pillar of the US Middle East policy has always been strong commitment to the security of 'Israel' as the number one ally of imperialism in the area. A close look at the debate over the AWACS deal shows that it concentrated on the position and role of 'Israel' and Saudi Arabia, respectively, in US strategy. The opponents of the deal believe that there is only room for 'Israel' as a major military power in the US Middle East strategy. In this view, other countries, even Saudi Arabia, cannot be fully counted on.

In contrast, the supporters of the deal believe that there is room for 'Israel' as well as the reactionary regimes in the US Middle East strategy. At the same time, the supporters made it clear that 'Israel' comes first. As one Mideast observer spoofed, those opposing the deal are like Catholics who think that a man (the US) can have only one wife ('Israel'); other women (the Arab reactionary regimes) must accept being mistresses without the privileges of the wife. On the other hand, those supporting the deal seem to be aware that in the Middle East a man can have more than one wife and at the same time grant one of them more privileges than the others.

The package was approved only after the provision of extensive guarantees that it poses no danger to the security (or military superiority) of 'Israel'. Agreement was reached on political and technical guarantees between the US and both 'Israel' and Saudi Arabia. In addition to the fact that Saudi Arabia is ruled by a backward reactionary regime, that would never think of confronting 'Israel', the US took a series of measures sufficient to render the AWACS incapable of endangering 'Israel', if the Saudis might so desire. The conditions of the sale stipulate the following:

- The AWACS are not to fly over a third country without the clear mutual consent of the US and Saudi Arabia.
- No citizen of a third country is allowed to board the AWACS or use their ground facilities without mutual US-Saudi consent.
- Access to the AWACS or their ground facilities is only for US or Saudi personnel that have been cleared (i.e. their backgrounds checked).
- The US is to remove the main computer which acts as a command center, analyzing the information gathered by the AWACS. 
- The US is to remove the jam resistant equipment. (Haig has stated that the Israelis are then capable of jamming the AWACS.)
- Ground-controlled explosives are to be installed, enabling destruction of the AWACS if they are endangered.

Added infrastructure for imperialist military presence

The other fact that was reaffirmed with the approval of the AWACS deal is that the USA considers Southwest Asia (the Gulf, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan) as a cornerstone in imperialism's confrontation with the Soviet Union. Strengthening client states, as well as building the infrastructure needed for the Rapid Deployment Force to be airlifted to the region, are the two elements that characterize imperialism's military efforts in the area. The nature of the AWACS deal
shows that it is an important step in the imperialist endeavor to bolster its military presence in the area. The items of the package — the AIM-9 air-to-air missiles, the conformal (reserve) fuel tanks for the F-15s and the KC-707 tankers — increase the military strength of the Saudi regime — and that of the US. In the paper presented to Congress, the US administration stated how the AWACS deal will help US forces when deployed to the area: "It helps meet some of our own military needs in the Gulf. To be able to respond to air threats to the Gulf oil facilities if called upon, we must have available an early warning defense network. The Saudi AWACS could be the foundation of such a network... with AWACS and the other enhancements, we will be providing an extensive logistics base and support infrastructure, including spare parts, trained personnel and specialized test and maintenance equipment which is fully compatible with the equipment which would be deployed with US forces. Having such access in Saudi Arabia would therefore facilitate deployment of a US tactical air force to the region in time of need."

If it is clear that the US is far more concerned about facilitating the deployment of its own forces to the area than about its stated concern of defending the sovereignty of the countries of the region.

Benefits for capitalist enterprise

The approval of the AWACS deal showed that the so-called national interests of the US are synonymous with the interests of the multinational monopolies. Only a crazy businessman would turn down a $8.5 billion deal.

It was reported that representatives of about 40 multinational corporations formed an ad hoc AWACS coalition in Washington D.C. The coalition included representatives of Boeing Corporation, United Technology Corporation, Exxon, Mobil Oil, Brown and Root, and Bechtel; it grouped aircraft and electronics industries, as well as oil and construction companies, that have huge investments in Saudi Arabia. During the debate, it was disclosed that current US trade with Saudi Arabia accounts for creating or sustaining 240-260,000 jobs in the US. In addition, about 50,000 Americans are currently employed in Saudi Arabia. It is estimated that as many as 340,000 jobs will be created or sustained in the US by the $8.5 billion package deal. The AWACS package is thus a powerful shot in the arm for the US economy, especially the troubled aircraft industry.

Enhancing imperialist-reactionary cooperation

The AWACS package will deepen the dependence of the reactionary Saudi regime on US imperialism. Under the pretext of training the Saudis, maintaining the AWACS and watching the "above the line (i.e. advanced) technology", US imperialism is assured of maintaining its military presence in Saudi Arabia into the early 1990s.

The air defense enhancement package will improve the Saudi forces. In turn, the Saudi role in serving imperialism will assume new dimensions. It has already been announced that the AWACS planes and the ground equipment can be the basis for a regional security strategy. One of the Reagan administration officials said, "The Saudis have taken the lead in the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, with their objective, the defense of the Gulf region... The AWACS aircraft and its ground environment system affords the capability to link the air defense networks of these states (the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council) into a unified system." The fact that the AWACS are to be kept under the supervision of the US means that the development of any regional security cooperation will also be under imperialism's supervision and in line with its objectives. This, however, is not to deny Saudi Arabia its leading role in regional affairs.

A main factor taken into consideration by the US administration when the AWACS deal was approved is the role of Saudi Arabia as a "moderate" force in Arab and Islamic politics, as well as in OPEC. As defined by US imperialism, "moderation" means facilitating the achievement of imperialist interests and goals. The Saudi regime has proven to be very good at that. In OPEC the Saudis are serving imperialism even at the expense of their own interests. (For details, refer to article on OPEC in Bulletin No. 55.) In the field of financial investment, the Saudis channel the oil revenues back into the capitalist countries, especially the USA and lately Japan. On the political level, the latest example of such "moderation" is Fahd's plan to 'resolve' the Middle East conflict. At the time when imperialism is feeling the need to expand Camp David, the Saudis pushed 'their' plan. (See editorial in this issue.)

The progressive position vis-a-vis the AWACS deal must be determined on the basis of who is benefiting from the deal and what interests it serves. The AWACS package is composed of highly advanced weapons given by US imperialism to the reactionary Saudi regime. The arms will be used to serve imperialist interests and to facilitate realization of US military strategy in the area. It is a new step in the imperialist drive to increase its military presence in the area, especially significant because it provides an Arab cover for this presence. Moreover, the $8.5 billion helps to ease the economic crisis of imperialism. Yet the important element in the price of the package is the political payments to be made by Saudi Arabia; the Fahd plan is only one example.

It goes without saying that these arms will not be used against the Zionist enemy. The more likely target is the patriotic and progressive forces. One material indication of this can already be seen. Some of the F-15s and the AWACS are to be stationed in the southwest part of Saudi Arabia, making Democratic Yemen a potential target.

The AWACS are due to be delivered in 1985-6. In the interim, the Saudis will be making the political installments. The role of Saudi Arabia as a "moderate" force will be enhanced and more Fahd plans are in the offering. Thus, in addition to opposing this new step in the imperialist arms build-up, the revolutionary forces are called upon to remain vigilant, prepared to confront and thwart the political conspiracies that accompany the enemy's military strategy.
EGYPT AFTER SADAT
INTERVIEW WITH THE EGYPTIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Shortly after the assassination of Sadat, the PFLP's magazine, Al Hadaf, interviewed Michel Kamel, member of the Politbureau of the Egyptian Communist Party. Following are excerpts from the interview.

Sadat’s death was not a surprise for us. He had gone too far on the capitulationist path, and was preparing for even more acts of treachery, strengthening his regime with a number of oppressive measures to confront the wrath of the Egyptian people. His recent arrest campaign had included all political forces and trends in Egypt. Sadat had thought that he could follow this path (of capitulation) to the end, but he was alone in believing this. What happened was not a surprise to anybody, not even to his friends...

Sadat had isolated Egypt from the Arab world, while before it had been a leader for the people in the area in facing the Zionist and imperialist interests. He took Egypt 10 years backwards. The economic situation has worsened; the rate of inflation increased; most of the people are living under the worst conditions ever known in Egypt, except for a small sector at the top.

Thus it was natural for all political forces in Egypt to work to topple the regime. Concerning us, we were actively working to organize and mobilize the masses, to enhance their political struggle. At the same time, we did not rule out that patriotic groups from the army would use violence against the symbol of treachery. However, we cannot separate what happened from the continuous development in Egypt, which in a large part is due to the persistent struggle of the radical patriotic forces, specifically those that in certain situations were standing alone in opposition and played an active role in exposing the political, social and economic policies of the regime. This led to qualitative changes in the consciousness of the masses, resulting in the encirclement and increasing isolation of the ruling elite. This is in addition to our flexible and principled policy of alliances with other forces, the centrists and rightists that gradually slipped from the base of the regime to join the opposition. Also there are the spontaneous uprisings of the masses in their economic struggle. Thus, in the final analysis, the heroic action of the military group coincided with the interests of the Egyptian people and the Arab liberation movement. What is most important now is the immediate work to develop future means of struggle to fit the new situation.

After the fall of Sadat, do you expect changes in the policy of the new regime?

We believe that even though it is important to be rid of Sadat, this will not be decisive in the battle. Sadat’s death creates a new and complicated situation, a mixture of positive and negative factors. On one hand it leads to increased repression and dependence on foreign intervention, which will negatively affect the momentum of the revolutionary movement. On the other hand, this increase in repression and foreign intervention is only a superficial and temporary expression of force that will in fact lead to the actual acceleration of the internal collapse of the regime’s institutions, especially after the crack in its invincibility demonstrated by Sadat’s death.

The head of the regime fell, but the regime itself continues. Sadat was surrounded by a group that benefited from his internal and external policies, and this group is still in power in Egypt. Its interests still follow the path of treason. Hosni Mubarak, the US and Israel have all declared their intentions to follow the same path. On the other hand, the chances of the regime being able to deceive the Egyptian people are almost nil. It cannot raise any slogans that can bring the people to its side, neither democracy nor prosperity, so Mubarak began his era by declaring martial law for a year and enacting a new arrest campaign. The US immediately increased its presence in Egypt and the surrounding area, sent 2 AWACS and planned joint military maneuvers (Bright Star).

Mubarak has no choice but to continue the normalization and autonomy talks until Israel completes its superficial withdrawal from the Sinai next April, and until the US completes its military build-up in the context of the international force for the Sinai. In other words, the loss of Sadat before he completed the dirty tasks of the pre-withdrawal phase forces his successor Mubarak to complete them himself, and be
involved in treason from the first moment of his presidency.

It is rumored that Sadat was no longer useful, and that the US was planning to get rid of him. How true do you think this is?

We do not rule out that the US was planning to topple Sadat’s regime, but we believe that it would not have attempted this until next April, after exhausting Sadat’s role in completing the normalization process, passing the Palestinian autonomy plan, and making serious preparations for military intervention, moving the 7th Fleet and starting the RDF. These measures included the nomination of Mubarak within 24 hours of Sadat’s death, and the turning of Cairo into a vast detention camp.

Another factor we should take into consideration is the expected power struggle between two groups in the capitalist authority. There is a possible conflict between the comprador bourgeoisie that surrounded Sadat and his family, and the large sector of the bourgeoisie, including those linked with imperialism, that want to rationalize the economic system.

There is also the conflict between the revolutionary camp and the counter-revolution. The revolutionary camp includes workers, poor peasants, the urban and rural petit bourgeoisie, some productive sectors of the middle bourgeoisie and revolutionary intellectuals. This alliance is gradually being strengthened and its influence is increasing, as a result of the mobilization and organization of the patriotic and progressive forces and trends into more developed forms. The leading role of the working class and its vanguard party is being emphasized within this alliance, whose aim is the establishment of a democratic, patriotic regime to continue the tasks of the democratic revolution leading to socialism.

What is the role of the Islamic trends in the Egyptian social conflict?

The resurgence of the Islamic and Christian trends that we have witnessed lately comes as a result of the worsening economic situation and the spread of corruption in the ruling class. There are also the planned policies of the ruling elite that encouraged these trends in order to use them to suppress and liquidate the growing leftist forces, to divert the people from the real economic and political problems and to cover up the treason of the regime. These trends supported the regime for a long time, and specialized in attacking the progressive forces. Then the religious trends grew to the extent that they thought they could compete for power.

However, the Egyptian people are radicals, regardless of the resurgence of religious trends and sectarian strife. Since Sadat came to power, Egypt has witnessed many student and worker activities, in which leftist forces played a large role. We still remember the demonstrations in the universities and the workers strike in 1972-73, the neighborhood uprisings in Al Sayida Zaynab, Bab as Sharia and Roadh al Faraj in 1976, the battle of the fishermen in Menileh and the uprising of January 1977. These all reflect the increase in popular resistance, using various political and economic forms, peaceful or violent, underground or overt. The patriotic and progressive forces played a big role in organizing these events, and faced exile and years in prison.

What are the forces that are potentially able to create the expected change in Egypt?

The only force able to achieve the tasks of the democratic national change and rejoin Egypt to the revolutionary Arab line is the radical patriotic movement, which is carrying a large responsibility under fascist and repressive conditions. There is no doubt that there are deep and strong relations between the struggle of the revolutionary forces in Arab, Egypt and all the Arab struggle movement. Thus true solidarity with the Egyptian people in their coming struggle can be expressed by intensifying the struggle of the Arab revolutionary forces against imperialism and Arab reaction, to defeat the trends of reconciliation and capitulation.
On October 16-18, approximately 3,000 people from 38 states and 15 other countries convened in Detroit, Michigan, USA, to hold the All-Peoples Congress. Among them were representatives for labor unions, national liberation movements and a broad range of organizations that defend the rights of oppressed groups in the American society. Organizations representing the Palestinian community in America attended. The purpose of this gathering was to plan the means of overturning the Reagan administration’s policies of war, domestic cutback and attacks on labor and other oppressed sectors.

Within the framework of the congress, a variety of workshops were held on specific issues and struggles. The following resolutions were adopted in the Middle East workshop of the All-Peoples Congress:

- All US troops and bases, like the Ras Banas base in Egypt, must get out of the Middle East.
- No US military aid, including AWACS, to any country in the Middle East.
- The workshop affirmed the rights of the people of the Middle East to conduct their own affairs free from intervention by the US government.
- The PLO is the only representative of the Palestinian people. Zionism is institutionalized repression against the Palestinian people.
- This workshop urges the people and organizations that make up this Peoples Congress to help build for the November 29 Coalition demonstration in New York celebrating the international day of the Palestinians.
- The executions by the Khomeini government in Iran were condemned. Support was affirmed for the people of Iran. The US government should stay out of Iran, and not take advantage of the present situation.

The wave of repression against the Egyptian people led by Sadat and his successor was condemned, and defined as resulting from the US government’s intervention there and from the Camp David accords.

Egyptian progressives wished to point out to the American people that the opposition in Egypt is not led by a few extremist individuals, rather it is a wide opposition, covering broad layers of all the people.

Throughout the workshop session a tremendous concern and opposition was expressed to the US government’s war moves in the Middle East, especially the Pentagon aggression towards Libya.

The Libyan speaker wished to inform the Congress that the Libyan people feel no hatred for the people of the US, but only solidarity as working and oppressed people to working and oppressed people.

The need to warn and educate the people of this country to the war danger was felt very strongly, especially by the representatives of the liberation struggles. The people of this congress are urged to help with this process.

The feeling was expressed again and again that working and oppressed people in this country have nothing to gain from fighting a Vietnam war against the people of the Middle East, and that Washington was trying to turn the Middle East into another El Salvador.
SOLIDARITY WITH CUBA

November 10, 1981

Comrade Fidel Castro, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba:
Comrades, members of the Central Committee Communist Party of Cuba

On behalf of the Central Committee of the PFLP, I would like to express our strong denunciation and condemnation of the US imperialist threats against the island of peace and liberty and its heroic people. I would also like to express our full solidarity with your struggle against these threats.

It is no coincidence that the policy of threats and sabotage carried out by imperialism is continuing against the people of Cuba and their courageous leadership. Nor is it a coincidence that the imperialists accuse the Cuban people and their leadership of terrorism. In fact, these are indications that Cuba is following the path which was chosen by its people and their revolutionary leadership which is true to the cause of liberation, peace and socialism.

Dear comrades,
At the time when the island of peace and socialism is being subjected to the imperialist threats and their barbaric means of destruction, imperialism is interfering in our area and plotting conspiracies against the Arab masses and the rights of the Palestinian people to return and exercise self-determination and establish their state in their national land.

The military maneuvers being carried out in Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Oman, in cooperation with and under the supervision of the Reagan Administration, are an example of the aggressive imperialist policies. Increasing imperialist military presence and world tension reflect the deepening crisis of imperialism, internally and worldwide. This is especially true due to the rising development of the socialist community, the national liberation forces and the forces of democracy and peace throughout the world.

We are confident that the Cuban people and their leadership, supported by the forces of world revolution with the Soviet Union in the forefront, are capable of teaching the imperialists a lesson that they will never forget.

LONG LIVE PALESTINIAN-CUBAN FRIENDSHIP
LONG LIVE PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM

George Habash,
General Secretary of the Central Committee
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

On the invitation of the Communist Party of Cuba, a delegation from the PFLP, headed by Comrade Taysir Kuba, member of the Politbureau and head of the Political Relations Department, visited the Socialist Republic of Cuba.

Official discussions were held between the Palestinian delegation and Comrade Pedro Miret, member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the CPC. The talks examined bilateral relations between the two political organizations. In addition to Comrade Taysir Kuba, represented in the PFLP delegation were comrades Abu Ahmed Fuad and Abu Issam, members of the Politbureau, and Comrade Ghassan of the International Relations Committee. On the Cuban side were comrades Pedro Miret, Claudio Ramos, head of a section in the General Department of Exterior Relations of the Central Committee, Ernesto Gomez Abascal, member of the Department and Jacinto Vazquez de la Garza, the Cuban ambassador to Lebanon.

The talks were held in a fraternal atmosphere. The Palestinian comrades expressed their support and solidarity with the Latin American and Caribbean people’s struggle, especially with the Cuban people in their confrontation with US imperialist threats and aggression. Comrade Pedro Miret, in the name of the CPC, emphasized the clear and continuous Cuban support for the just struggle of the Palestinian people to achieve their legitimate national rights, including the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, led by the PLO—the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. He also condemned the imperialist, Zionist and reactionary plots against the Palestinian revolution.

The Palestinian delegation also met with Comrade Jesus Montane, an alternate Politbureau member and responsible for the General Department of Exterior Relations of the Central Committee. The delegation visited places of political, social and economic importance in Havana and Holguin provinces.
On October 20th, the USSR announced that it had conferred full diplomatic status on the Moscow office of the PLO. The announcement followed an official visit by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to the Soviet Union, where he met with numerous Soviet leaders, including Comrade Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU.

This political and diplomatic achievement comes as a result of the prolonged and determined struggle of the Palestinian masses. It is a reflection of our people’s victories and successes on all levels – politically, militarily and organizationally – and their steadfast insistence that the PLO is their sole legitimate representative.

Increased recognition from the USSR has a special importance, and gives an added impetus to our struggle. The Soviet Union is a major power, the leader of the socialist community and the center of support for anti-imperialist struggle in the world. Its conferring full diplomatic status on the PLO will do much for our cause, strengthening the PLO’s legitimacy worldwide. Other progressive countries will be likely to follow suit, making it more difficult for imperialism and Zionism to deny the legitimacy and importance of the Palestinian cause on the international level.

While the upgrading of diplomatic status reflects the increase in the PLO’s recognition, it also crowns the special relationship that exists between the PLO and the Soviet Union. The USSR has maintained a principled stand in support of the Palestinian people, providing important material and political aid. The deepening of this relationship, coming at a time of increasing imperialist, Zionist and reactionary maneuvers, points to the sincere commitment of the USSR to the Palestinians’ struggle for their just rights. The entire Palestinian resistance movement can only be strengthened by its alliance with the leading force for liberation, progress and socialism.